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Abstract 
 
Climate change presents a wide range of concerns that can jeopardize international security. 
Among those concerns are neo-Malthusian worries of diminishing natural resources. Predictive 
models suggest that rainfall and temperature anomalies have the potential to reduce water basins, 
crop production, increase land degradation among other perils that threaten human security. This 
concern is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa given the region’s strong dependence on rain-
fed agriculture. Despite strong claims from various world leaders and scientists of a direct climate-
conflict nexus, little empirical evidence has been devoted to find a systematic causal pathway of 
this kind. What is more, the literature not explored the relationship between climate change and 
low-intensity forms of social unrest. Therefore, contrary to most of the literature that explores a 
direct climate-conflict relationship, this dissertation contributes to the literature along two lines. 
First, it explores the relationship between climate change and socio-political unrest. Second, rather 
than simply assume a direct relationship between climate shocks and conflict, this dissertation 
examines: a) the effects of climate change on food scarcity, and the impact of that scarcity, in turn, 
on the likelihood of social unrest and conflict, and b) the effects of climate change on land 
degradation, that the impact of that degradation, in turn, on the frequency of communal violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: conflict, resource scarcity, food security, climate change. 
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ONE 
 
IN PURSUIT OF CORNUCOPIA  
 
Since the time of Thomas Malthus, a longstanding fear among scholars and policy makers has 
been that population growth would eventually outpace agricultural production. Lack of food would 
then lead to undernourishment or, in the worst case, famine (Ehrlich 1968; Meadows et al. 1972). 
So far this “doomsday” scenario has not happened because technological advancements have been 
able to keep up with population growth. For instance, in the 1940s a pilot program sponsored by 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government, the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT), developed higher per-acre yields of maize and wheat through 
agricultural technology and innovation, becoming known as the “Green Revolution.”1  
While the Green Revolution is credited with saving over one billion lives, hunger is far 
from eradicated. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ 
(FAO) latest annual State of Food Insecurity in the World report, 795 million people do not have 
enough food to live a healthy and active life (FAO 2015). However, the number rises to about 850 
million when short-term undernourishment from external shocks (e.g., droughts, recessions) and 
unequal household food distribution are included (De Schutter 2015). The idea that, on a planet 
with sufficient food, almost one billion people could go hungry (while another billion 
overconsume) led scholars to shift the food-security debate away from food production and 
towards the role of governments in distributing food. In his seminal work, Poverty and Famines 
(1981), Amartya Sen suggests that famines occur when there is a breakdown in the means of food 
acquisition by individuals—when individuals are unable to attain food through all legal means 
                                                 
1 For more information on the CIMMYT, please visit: http://www.cimmyt.org/  
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available: growing food, buying food, working for food, or being given food by others (Sen 
1981:2). In other words, famines represent a failure of the state and political institutions, and are a 
phenomenon not associated with well-functioning polities with strong institutions, such as 
democracies. Until recently, the debate over food security had been dominated by these so-called 
distributionists; however, recent developments have revived Malthusian concerns about the future 
of food security.  
Although innovations in agricultural technologies have been praised for increasing food 
production worldwide, neo-Malthusians have two main concerns about the future of food security. 
First, the production of several staple grains has already reached a plateau. In a recent study, 
Seppelt et al. (2014) find that global peak rates were reached for cassava, soybeans and wheat in 
2011, and for maize and rice in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Neither new strains of genetically 
modified crops nor new fertilization techniques are increasing yields (The Economist 2016). 
According to the FAO, these five crops provide about 45 percent of global caloric intake (FAO 
2013). 
Second, neo-Malthusians point to climate change and argue that, as average global 
temperature continues to rise, crop production will decline in tropical regions. This argument is 
supported by the Fifth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), which suggests that climate change has the potential to cause starvation for large segments 
of the world population over the next 30 years. Simply put, as global temperatures continue to rise 
and rainfall becomes more erratic, crop yields in tropical areas will decrease or fail to materialize 
as the result of too much or too little rainfall. Not only is climate change projected to reduce crops 
in some parts of the world, but water basins and grasslands are also expected to decline.  
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In a 2015 report to the U.S. Congress, the Department of Defense recognized that climate 
change “is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural 
disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water.” The report 
further contends that some of these “impacts are already occurring.”2 However, what are the causal 
links among climate change, basic resources and conflict? Does climate-induced resource scarcity 
or abundance increase the likelihood of conflict? If so, under what conditions? In an attempt to 
answer these questions, this dissertation examines the effects of climate change on food scarcity, 
and the impact of that scarcity, in turn, on the likelihood of social unrest and conflict.  
While neo-Malthusian arguments have been chastised as “alarmist” by scholars who favor 
political institutions as the primary explanation for food scarcity, only a handful of large-N studies 
have attempted to resolve this debate. The purpose in this dissertation is not to choose a side, but 
rather to incorporate both institutional and environmental paradigms to develop a more 
comprehensive way to examine resource scarcity and its potential social repercussions.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is selected because it proves fertile ground to investigate potential 
theoretical links in two ways. The region is projected to experience the largest population growth 
by 2050, and it will be among the most impacted regions as a result of climate change and 
variability in the next fifteen years.3 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I 
will explain the concept of basic resources used in this dissertation and the causes of scarcity. 
Second, an argument is made for the importance of climate change in decreasing basic resources, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, I provide a roadmap for the rest of this dissertation. 
 
                                                 
2 Congressional Report. 2015. “National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate.” 
Accessed [January 3, 2016] at: http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-national-
implications-of-climate-change.pdf  
3 Sea level is not expected to strongly affect human security until 20802100, when the rise in sea level could reach 
6080 cm, assuming a 2°C warming increase. 
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Causes of scarcity: political institutions, demand and supply 
 
Humans have three basic metabolic needs: air, food and water. For the purpose of this research, 
only food and water are of importance, given that their fulfillment is dependent upon two natural 
resources—land and freshwater—along with their shared creation: crops. In short, basic human 
needs are dependent upon ecosystems that allow for the development of three basic resources: 
fertile land, freshwater and crops.  Fertile land is important not only for growing crops, but also 
for the expansion and sustainability of grasslands in rural areas that are essential for the livelihood 
of pastoral communities. Likewise, freshwater is not only crucial for human consumption, but also 
for the nourishment of vegetation and crops. Finally, crops are essential because they are the main 
source of caloric consumption for people.  
Basic resources can become scarce in three different ways. First, demand-induced scarcity 
is caused by either population growth or an increase in per capita consumption of a resource 
(Homer-Dixon & Blitt 1998). For instance, as population growth continues, food systems will face 
additional pressure to produce more food. Sheer population growth is, however, not the only reason 
to produce more food. For instance, economic prosperity in China, India and some parts of Africa 
is driving an increase in demand for eggs, meat and dairy products, boosting pressure to grow more 
feeder grains for livestock. This puts greater pressure on land use, which often results in 
overgrazing as well as large areas of forests being cleared out in order to keep up with livestock 
and human needs.  
 Second, institutionally induced scarcity (often called structural scarcity) arises from the 
intentionally or unintentionally unequal distribution of resources among a population and often 
occurs when a resource is concentrated in the hands of a few. This can result from ineffective 
institutional arrangements or struggles among social groups over the allocation of the commodity 
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(Sen 1981; Boyce 1987). Structural scarcity has been the primary reason why hunger has persisted 
in poorer regions of the world since the “Green Revolution” took off.4 Unintentional distribution 
failures mostly occur when poor governments do not have the capacity to move resources from 
parts of the country with abundance to areas that are facing scarcity. Food, for example, is 
perishable and heavy, so countries with poor infrastructure often move food from farms to cities 
at a very high cost. However, when droughts occur, the movement of food proceeds in the opposite 
direction, from city warehouses to rural areas, and the cost of transportation to remote areas 
increases (Ó Gráda 2015).  
On top of this, lack of political will can hinder or worsen distribution efforts. Political 
leaders in all political systems risk removal from office due to social unrest. To avoid removal 
from office, governments in developing countries tend develop an urban bias—the inclination to 
be more responsive to the policy concerns and preferences of urbanities at the expense of rural 
dwellers (Hendrix 2012). As Robert Bates (1981:114) points out, for political leaders the cost is 
“high in terms of loss of support in the urban areas; and their political benefits are low in terms of 
their ability to secure support from the countryside.” Therefore, this bias incentivizes political 
leaders to invest in policies that disproportionately favor urban dwellers who are closely 
concentrated near to the seat of government power, and face lower costs to acting collectively 
against the leader (Bates 1981; Stasavage 2005). 
Intentional failures to distribute resources mostly occur during times of armed conflict. 
Using food or water as a means to subvert an enemy is not a modern development. Since medieval 
times, a common tactic during long-term conflicts has been to cut off food or water supply lines 
warring towns and villages. As a consequence, prices go up, trade is disrupted, local deliveries do 
                                                 
4 World Food Program: What causes hunger? Accessed June 10, 2016 at: https://www.wfp.org/hunger/causes  
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not take place, supermarkets may close, and markets stop functioning because farmers are unable 
to get their product across enemy lines. The most recent example of this is likely taking place in 
the ongoing Syrian conflict. For instance, the World Food Program (WFP) reports that people in 
the town of Madaya are eating grass, boiling leaves and making stew from almost nothing due to 
a food blockade by government forces and rebels alike. 
Finally, supply-induced scarcity results from a disruption to the total quantity of production 
in the supply chain by degradation or depletion of environmental resources.  Environmental change 
often reflects long-term degradation caused by human activity (e.g., pollution), but this is not 
always the case.5 For instance, natural hazards and disasters are major temporary causes of food 
insecurity. The FAO estimates that between 2003 and 2013, natural hazards and disasters affected 
more than 1.9 billion people worldwide (FAO 2015). Ethiopia, for instance, is currently facing its 
worst drought in 50 years, leaving millions of people in need of food in a country where about 40 
percent of the population is undernourished.6 By some estimates, the drought has killed 90 percent 
of crops in areas and at least one million livestock. While hazards such as tropical storms, floods 
and drought are a normal part of nature, climate change is expected to multiply the frequency and 
intensity of these hazards, which will increase the short-term scarcity of basic resources in some 
parts of the world. In short, the problem is about to get worse.  
 
Why climate change and variability matter 
 
Climate variability refers to short-term variations in temperature and precipitation around the 
mean. Climate change refers to a long-term or permanent change in mean conditions. Climate and 
                                                 
5 For reasons other than demand of a resource 
6 Food Security Portal. Country profile: Ethiopia. Accessed June 3, 2016: 
http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/ethiopia  
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rainfall variability are known to be extreme in large parts of Africa (Adano & Witsenburg 2009). 
Overall, the planet has warmed by about 0.8°C since pre-industrial times.7 Climate researchers 
have concluded with high confidence that temperatures will continue to increase over the next 
decades, due largely to anthropogenic activities (IPCC 2014; Cook et al. 2013). The IPCC predicts 
that climate change will affect different social and environmental systems as temperatures and sea 
levels continue to rise, and as erratic rainfall reduces water availability in some parts of the world 
(IPCC 2007, 2014).  
Figure A.  Annual rainfall deviation (%) from the mean (1093.25mm) for sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1990-2012 
 
 Author’s calculations 
 
The IPCC points out that climate change is already having negative impacts on the 
environment. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, some observable effects include increased land 
and water degradation (IPCC 2014; World Bank 2013). Given the great variability of rainfall in 
the region over the last 25 years (Figure A), this erratic rainfall has had strong effects on the 
availability of basic resources. Moreover, rainfall deviations from the mean (whether below or 
above) can temporarily reduce or degrade resources. For example, too much rainfall can remove 
                                                 
7 Warming in northern latitudes has been greater, however (IPCC 2007, 2014).  
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soil from one location and deposit it in another, depriving land of its nutrients and capacity to 
sustain vegetation.  
Similarly, the distribution of resources can temporarily be affected by erratic rainfall when 
infrastructure such as roads, bridges and warehouses is damaged. Heavy and persistent rainfall 
often damages and/or destroys bridges and roads, which limits access to affected areas and makes 
the distribution of resources harder for national and international relief agencies. Figure B shows 
a steady increase in the number of floods from 1990 to 2012 in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, 
between 2003 and 2013, natural hazard events in Africa lead to economic losses of about $13 
billion in the crop sector due to flooding and storm damage, and $11 billion in livestock losses 
attributable to drought (FAO 2015). 
 Figure B. Total occurrence of floods and droughts in sub-Saharan Africa 
  
          Source: The International Disaster Database. 
 
According to the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), the global land temperature for 2015 was 1.33°C (2.39°F) above the 20th century 
average, beating the previous records in 2007 and 2010. This is the largest margin by which an 
annual global temperature has been broken and it is expected to be surpassed in 2016 (NOAA 
2015).  The rapid changes of climate change and variability can have profound and different 
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consequences for countries around the world. For instance, in 2015, a severe heatwave claimed 
more than 1,000 lives in Karachi, Pakistan, while a severe drought caused food shortages in 
Ethiopia. 
So what impacts, if any, does climate change have on human societies? This research 
focuses on the social consequences from scarcity of land and crops via temperature and 
precipitation anomalies. Both land and crops are considered crucial, given their direct impact on 
the livelihood of millions of people in the region. First, the importance of land is crucial for 
grasslands to flourish in rural areas. It is estimated that around 12 million hectares of productive 
land become barren due to drought every year (UNCCD 2014). While land that is used to grow 
crops can be rejuvenated by using fertilizers or agricultural techniques such as crop rotation to 
renew soil nutrients, land under no direct human care depends solely on climatic elements to 
receive its nutrients (Reich et al. 2001). For this reason, the concern here is not with the effect that 
land degradation has on crop production when climate shocks occur, but rather the potential effects 
that climate shocks have on land degradation, and in turn, this degradation has on communal 
violence. Land degradation is defined as “the reduction in the capability of the land to support a 
particular use” (Bullock & Houérou 1995: 6). Higher levels of land degradation reduce grassland 
that limit the amount of feed for the livestock of pastoral communities. As these communities 
depend on their herds for income and nourishment, a decrease in grassland as a result of high levels 
of land degradation leaves pastoralist communities particularly vulnerable to weather shocks. 
While human activities such as deforestation and overgrazing are critical causes of land 
degradation, rainfall (its amount, duration, intensity, and the frequency of high-intensity events) 
and warming temperatures (which prevent the sustained growth of vegetation) are also key causes 
10 
 
of land degradation. In summation, this research considers land scarcity (or degradation) to be 
crucial only in rural areas where soil revitalization is not practiced. 
Second, climate change’s impacts on agriculture are arguably among the most critical for 
sub-Saharan Africa countries, given the region’s strong dependence on rain-fed agriculture. 
Therefore, anthropogenic climate change has the potential (and is expected) to significantly impact 
regional food productivity. Current projections of climate change impacts on tropical crop yields 
are, on average, negative. In Southern Africa, for instance, the NOAA noted that by November 
2014, the lack of precipitation in Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe had led to soil 
deterioration, only to witness a complete reversal of weather anomalies one month later. Rainfall 
brought crippling precipitation surpluses that revived the soil, only to destroy it again by depriving 
the soil of oxygen with the excess of water (Di Liberto 2015).  By their estimates, “25,000 hectares 
of cropland were impacted in Malawi, 65,000 hectares in Mozambique, 9,900 hectares of rice 
fields were flooded in Madagascar, and an additional 7,900 hectares of crops damaged in the 
region.”8 When climate shocks occur, they have repercussions for the livelihoods of millions of 
people. 
This dissertation proposes that, under certain circumstances, a scarcity of land or crops 
from climate shocks can cause low-intensity forms of social unrest. Scholars of conflict processes 
have long debated whether resource scarcity or abundance lead to intra- and inter-state conflicts. 
As the literature stands today, scarcity of renewable resources is closely associated with a higher 
likelihood of low-intensity conflict, and non-renewable resource scarcity has been associated with 
large-scale violence (DeSoysa 2002). However, there continues to be little consensus on the 
climateconflict nexus (for a critical review, see Salehyan 2008; Nordås & Gleditsch 2007). A 
                                                 
8 Published by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network http://www.fews.net 
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superior understanding of whether, and under conditions, climatic shocks contribute to violent 
conflicts is fundamental not only for scientific research, but also to better prescribe adaptation 
policies that can mitigate the occurrence of violent conflict.  For instance, if the interaction between 
climatic shocks and crop scarcity does play a role in sparking social unrest, the region will have to 
mitigate the effects of climate change in the coming decades. First, crop production will need to 
vastly increase in order to keep up with current population trends. Second, research and 
technological development efforts need to improve. Finally, people may have to adjust diet quality 
and diversity to better meet needs in terms of energy—all of which must be achieved with minimal 
environmental costs (e.g., deforestation). Expecting to increase crop production solely by 
expanding croplands is not only not ineffective, but also environmentally perilous (Griffon 2006).  
For instance, if we keep the current crop yield constant for sub-Saharan Africa and expand the 
potentially available cropland to its maximum, crop yields would barely be sufficient to meet the 
projected increase in demand while resulting in the complete deforestation of the region (Berg et 
al. 2013). 
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature on the climateconflict nexus by 
exploring an interactive effect between crop/land scarcity and climatic shocks that can contribute 
to violent conflicts (Hendrix & Glasser 2007; Salehyan 2008; Theisen 2012). First, it tackles the 
assumption that the climateconflict nexus is a direct link from climatic anomalies towards 
conflict. This theoretical streamlining wrongly assumes that people in poor countries respond to 
climate shocks by attacking each other or rebelling against the state (Releigh et al. 2014). Second, 
it challenges the overwhelming focus on explaining civil wars as the main outcome of climatic 
conditions by looking at low-intensity forms of social unrest that are short of full-blown civil wars.  
 
 
12 
 
Organization of Dissertation  
 
My dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews two sets of literature, the first on climate 
change and renewable resources, and the second on natural resources and conflict. The chapter 
concludes by offering the theoretical approach that is used in this dissertation. Careful 
consideration is placed on the role of economic grievances as potential triggers for social unrest, 
as well as the role of political institutions in subduing or tolerating distinct forms of collective 
action. Moreover, while some scholars (Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang et al. 2013) studying the climate-
conflict relationship have recently argued for the exclusion of control variables (e.g., economic 
development) that may plausibly be affected by climatic factors and produce bias coefficients, this 
dissertation attempts to resolve this dispute, especially by drawing upon others who argue that 
control variables are necessary to place “the relative causal weight of climatic factors in context 
and to address the confounding effect factors that may also trend over time” (Devlin & Hendrix 
2014:32). 
 Before I examine the influence of climatic factors, in Chapter 3 I examine whether poor 
access to water and food are associated with an increased likelihood of popular protests. I examine 
this nexus at the micro-level by using 20052013 survey data from the Afrobarometer. Much of 
the debate over access to water and food has failed to be incorporated into the literature on protest 
participation. The purpose of this chapter is to fill this gap. It is important to note that this chapter 
does not examine food or water riots alone, but rather all forms of self-reported participation in 
popular protest. This is done to account for times when access to water or food may not be the 
principal motivation for protest participation, but poor access can still exacerbate previously held 
grievances.  
13 
 
 Chapter 4 introduces the role of climatic shocks and their possible impact on social unrest 
via declines in crop production. Contrary to the previous one, this chapter explores if supply 
induced scarcity (of food in this case) increases the frequency of social unrest events in the region. 
That is to say, rather than assume that climatic shocks by themselves increase the likelihood of 
conflict, this chapter explores whether the actual interaction between precipitation and/or 
temperature variability and crop production increase the frequency of social unrest. I refrain from 
explaining civil war as the main outcome of interest and shift the focus towards low-intensity 
forms of social unrest. 
 Similarly, chapter 5 examines the role that climatic shocks have on communal violence via 
land degradation. Across Africa, about 50 million pastoralists and up to 200 million agro-
pastoralists live in arid and semi-arid zones (Kamuanga et al. 2008).9 Both communities depend 
on land fertility to feed livestock or cultivate crops for their livelihoods. While land degradation is 
a slow-moving process, continuous temperature and precipitation anomalies have the potential to 
deteriorate topsoil and exacerbate the process of land degradation and desertification. Therefore, 
in this chapter I suggest that continuous climate shocks worsen land degradation, which reduces 
fertile land to feed livestock. Given a smaller “pie” for livestock feed, pastoral communities will 
seek to maximize their gains from a limited pool of resources, increasing the frequency of 
communal violence. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 offers a summary of the findings from the previous three empirical 
chapters and discusses their academic and policy implications, followed by concluding remarks. 
Subsequently, the references utilized throughout this dissertation are presented as well as an 
                                                 
9 Pastoralists are exclusively herders. Agro-pastoralists engage in a mixture of herding and agriculture. 
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appendix with supplemental materials. Overall, throughout the chapters in this dissertation, I 
expect to find that in non-climate scenarios (chapter 3), poor access to renewable resources 
increases the likelihood of popular protest. Similarly, I expect to find that the interaction between 
climate shocks and basic resource scarcity increases the frequency of low-intensity social unrest 
and communal violence in sub-Saharan Africa.  
  
15 
 
 
TWO 
 
CLIMATE SHOCKS AND SOCIAL UNREST IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
 
Scholars of conflict processes have yet to fully examine the causal nexus between climate shocks 
and low-intensity social unrest. The various outcomes that climate shocks will have on social 
coherence need to be further incorporated into the research agenda to better understand and 
mitigate social breakdown. For instance, as basic resources dwindle as the result of climate shocks, 
will social unrest become the new normal? The answer to this question motivates this research. 
Social unrest does not occur by chance. People do not simply wake up one day by the 
whimsy of the gods and decide to protest, riot or march. Rather, individuals choose to participate 
with the motivation to address a wrong that has been done to them by the government (Brockett 
2005).  Although the laundry list of grievances against governments can be long and complex, 
because some resources such as water, food and fertile land are among the basic survival needs for 
our species,10 I propose that under certain conditions, scarcity of these basic resources can cause 
social unrest.  
There are four critical reasons why sub-Saharan Africa is the best region to conduct such a 
study. First, the region stands apart in its strong dependence on rain-fed agriculture—only four 
percent of total cropland is irrigated (IFPRI 2010). Second, more than half of the total global 
population growth between 2015 and 2050 will occur in Africa. Growing at a pace of 2.55 percent 
annually, 1.3 billion people will be added to Africa by 2050—an increase from 1.2 billion today 
to about 2.5 billion (UN DESA 2015). Third, the amount of per capita renewable internal fresh 
                                                 
10 According to NASA, the five basic survival needs are: oxygen, water, food, sleep and shelter. 
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water has been in decline for the past two decades and is expected to further decline in the near 
future (Pietersen & Beekman 2006). Finally, about 500 million hectares of land are estimated to 
have undergone land degradation in Africa since the 1950s—45 percent of which was caused by 
water erosion (IFAD-GEF 2002).  
This chapter constructs an argument to explain why individuals decide to partake in low-
intensity social unrest when basic resource stress occurs. I am interested in both the micro 
(individual) and macro (state-centric) processes. With this in mind, this research has three main 
goals. The first is to assess whether limited access to water and food makes people more prone to 
protest. This assessment is done in Chapter 3 by examining Sen´s preposition that weak institutions 
are the key reason behind food shortages. The second goal is to explore the nexus between climate 
shocks, crop stress and social unrest. Moving away from Sen´s preposition, Chapter 4 investigates 
the interactive effect, if any, that climate shocks and cereal yields have on peaceful and violent 
episodes of social unrest. Doing this will allow me to discern if a dual-track process for resource 
scarcity has begun to unfold. In other words, have some basic resources become harder to acquire 
due to structural-induced scarcity and supply-induced scarcity causes? The final goal of this 
dissertation is to investigate the causal links between climate shocks, land degradation and 
communal violence. While Chapter 5 continues to examine a potential interactive effect between 
climate shocks and basic resources, two important shifts take place. First, moving away from food 
production, this chapters examines the interactive effect between climate shocks and land 
degradation. Second, the dependent variable changes from protest to another form of low-intensity 
unrest: communal violence. These modifications allow me to examine the effects that climate 
shocks are having on other basic resources such as land fertility.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section one provides a review of the literatures on 
climate-change resource scarcity and climate-change conflict. Section two offers my theoretical 
contribution by combining both sets of literature and addressing their main gaps. Section three 
postulates potential alternative arguments, and the final section presents an overall conclusion.  
 
Literature Review 
 
On climate change and resource scarcity  
 
There is both a robust literature and international consensus showing that anthropogenic-induced 
climate change is underway. The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the IPCC argues that 
greenhouse gas emissions and other anthropogenic activity, driven mainly by population and 
economic growth, are “extremely likely” to be the dominant source of the observed linear increase 
in global temperature.11 For the 18802012 period, the average global temperature increased 
0.85°C.  Similarly, NASA indicates that global sea levels increased nearly 8 centimeters (3 inches) 
from 1992 to 2015.12 Using current emission trends, estimates project an increase in global 
temperature between 1.4°C and 2.5°C by 2050. A warmer planet further increases sea level, 
decreases Antarctic ice sheets, increases ocean acidity, and leads to erratic rainfall patterns (IPCC 
2007, World Bank 2012, 2013). 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2015), the African 
mainland has contributed the least amount of greenhouse emissions worldwide.13 Nevertheless, 
the region will be the hardest hit by the changing climate. Overall, Africa has become warmer over 
the last 50100 years, with changes varying by region (IPCC 2014). As a rule of thumb, wet 
                                                 
11
AR5 is the most comprehensive and up-to-date report on climate change by the IPCC. AR5 and previous reports 
can be found at: http://www.ipcc.ch/  
12 NASA’s data on sea-level rise is available at: http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/  
13 The U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed [August 12, 2015]at: www.eia.gov  
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regions are likely to become wetter and dry regions are likely to get drier. For example, Northern 
Africa has experienced an increase in heatwaves per year, while Western Africa has seen an 
increase in extreme rainfall and floods. Eastern Africa has experienced erratic precipitation 
patterns that result in heavy rainfall and/or droughts over the last 60 years, while Southern Africa 
has experienced an increase in extreme heat and rain-deficit conditions (IPCC 2007, 2014; Funk 
et al. 2008; Yabi & Afouda 2012; Haensler et al. 2013).  
Aside from the already observed impacts on various ecosystems due to population 
increases, overfishing, and land cover change from grassland or forest to croplands, climate 
variability will further influence ecosystems through fire, pest outbreaks and extreme weather 
events. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that warming is very likely to continue in Africa 
for the next 20 to 50 years, regardless of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, due to the 
emissions already emitted into the atmosphere.  
According to a report by the National Academy of Science (2011), warmer temperatures 
increase water evaporation, which helps to “boost the total amount of water vapor in the 
atmosphere by seven percent for every 1°C of warming.” This means that in wet areas, atmospheric 
moisture can increase rain and snow, whereas in dry areas it can exacerbate the impact of drought. 
Overall, the report estimates that countries between the 30° N and 30° S parallels, including most 
of sub-Saharan Africa, are expected to have reductions of 510 percent in precipitation for every 
degree of warming.  
The effects of climate change are diverse and complex. The IPCC (2007) projects that by 
2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa will be exposed to water stress, and some 
countries will experience declines in rain-fed agriculture of up to 50 percent. As temperatures 
continue to rise, agricultural production—one of the principal economic sectors in terms of 
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employment share and regional GDP—will stagnate and possibly reverse the improved 
performance of the agricultural sector over the last decade in sub-Saharan Africa (Nin-Pratt et al. 
2012). As temperatures increase and rainfall becomes erratic, crop yields in Africa are estimated 
to drop by 510 percent per degree of warming (National Research Council 2011). 
Crops yields, especially cereals, are crucial to the nourishment of the sub-Saharan African 
peoples.14 Using household survey data from 19 sub-Saharan countries, Chauvin et al. (2012) find 
cereals to be the most purchased food item for both rural and urban households. Moreover, 
agricultural sales are among the most important source of income for rural dwellers—and less so 
for urban dwellers who tend to be more dependent on wages.  
On natural resources and conflict  
 
After the United Nations described the potential role of natural resources—particularly 
diamonds—in civil strife in the 1990s, academics began to examine the potential nexus between 
resources and conflict. The result was a large body of literature that can be loosely divided into 
two camps: scholars focused on the relationship between resource abundance and conflict, and 
those interested in the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict. 
 Collier & Hoeffler (1998; 2004) were among the first scholars to find a statistical 
correlation between natural resources and civil war. Their findings suggest that resource wealth 
increases the likelihood of armed conflict. However, other scholars found no correlation between 
resource wealth and civil war when using alternative datasets or measurements of resource wealth. 
Using the same measurement of resource abundance as Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) and Fearon (2005) find no clear evidence that primary commodity exports increase the 
likelihood of civil war. Fearon (2005) suggests, however, that there is a relationship between oil 
                                                 
14 Cereals include, but are not limited to wheat, rice, barley, maize, millet, and sorghum. 
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and armed conflict—a conclusion similar to that of DeSoysa (2002), who finds the total availability 
of natural resources to be unrelated to conflict, while the availability of mineral wealth is. Ross 
(2004: 37-38) similarly finds “oil, gemstones and drugs to be strong indicators for the onset of 
civil conflict, while other primary commodities—in particular, legal agricultural commodities—
do not have an effect on civil war.” Over time, it became clear that the broader the definition of 
natural resources, the less these resources are related to civil war onset (DeSoysa & Neumayer 
2007). The literature suggests non-renewable resources to be more closely associated with large-
scale violence, given their high resale value. 
 Three overlapping theoretical relationships seek to explain these so-called “resource wars.” 
The first theoretical relationship, conflict resources, highlights opportunity as a key factor between 
resource wealth and armed conflict. This framework proposes that resource bounty provides rebels 
with the opportunity to loot resources in order to finance rebellion or to provide the prospects for 
personal enrichment (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Le Billon 2001). This model, however, fails 
to consider that rebel behavior can also be motivated by poverty and inequality. Originally, Collier 
& Hoeffler (1998) supported the idea that rebellion was the consequence of personal gains (greed), 
and as a result, individuals would rebel when there was an opportunity to loot resources that would 
lead to self-enrichment. Later, the authors modified their argument to claim that armed conflicts’ 
onset can occur due to revenue flows in the form of primary commodity exports (Collier & 
Hoeffler 2004). 
The second theoretical relationship, resource curse, emphasizes institutional vulnerability 
as a key factor between resource abundance and conflict. Because resource rents can be an 
important part of government revenue, countries with abundant resources tend to underperform 
economically due to “exposure to high price fluctuations, declining terms of trade and natural 
21 
 
capital depreciation…” (Le Billon 2008). Politically, resource rent effects often lead to high levels 
of political corruption and weak governance. As a result, these countries tend to depend on 
resource exports to boost economic growth, leaving the state vulnerable to rebel capture when the 
opportunity arises via failing economic growth or political transitions (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Auty 
2007; Le Billon 2008). 
The final theoretical relationship, resource conflicts, highlights individual grievances as a 
key factor between resource scarcity and conflict. This relationship mainly focuses on renewable 
resources and their impact on livelihood (Homer-Dixon 1999). Working from the belief that there 
are enough renewable resources available for everyone, the central assumption is that resource 
control or discrimination (usually by elites) exacerbates grievances, increasing the risk of conflict. 
Although time has been kind to scholars who focus on resource abundance, time has not been so 
gracious to scholars interested in resource scarcity. There are some studies that find no relationship 
between resource scarcity and conflict. Bates et al. (2003) find no significant relationship between 
political instability and environmental variables. Similarly, Binningsbø et al. (2007:235), using a 
broad measurement of scarcity, find a poor relationship between resource scarcity and conflict. In 
fact, their results suggest that, contrary to neo-Malthusian arguments, that “a higher consumption 
of the earth’s resources per capita is associated with peace,” rather than conflict. These results have 
led critics of neo-Malthusian scholars to formulate two arguments against the resource-scarcity 
conflict relationship. On one hand, some argue that the relationship ignores too many intervening 
non-environmental variables (Le Billon 2001; Theisen 2008; Brown 2010; Hendrix 2011). On the 
other, cornucopians or resource optimists, posit that the solution for scarcity lies in technological 
innovation, as it has in the past (Lomborg 2003; Juul 2005). 
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Nevertheless, there are those who do find a positive association between resource scarcity 
and conflict (Home-Dixon 1999; Kahl 2006; Raleigh & Urdal 2007; Urdal 2008; Fjelde & Uexkull 
2012). The scarcity debate is an old one. Originally, the argument was demand-induced: 
population growth would outpace food production. In this vein, Urdal (2005: 430) initially found 
that “countries experiencing high population growth are not at a greater risk of conflict compared 
to countries with low levels of population pressure.” In a later study that uses subnational 
geographical data, Raleigh & Urdal (2007) find both high levels of land degradation and water 
scarcity to be related to increased conflict, although the increases in risk are small. Contesting this 
argument, Tir and Diehl (1998) lend support to the cornucopian argument by finding that countries 
with a high level of technological development are better able to mitigate the effects of population 
growth on conflict formation.  
Nowadays, the discussion has shifted towards a supply-induced argument (or a 
combination of both): climate change-induced environmental degradation, along with population 
growth (e.g., urbanization and more mouths to feed), reduces the availability of renewables such 
as water and food (Hendrix & Glaser 2007). This new line of reasoning suggests two broad causal 
mechanisms in which climate-induced declines in resources can lead to conflict. First, fewer 
resources result in direct confrontation among social groups for livelihood. This argument, 
however, is too general. It treats the climate-conflict path as a direct one, overlooking specific 
questions about which natural resources tend to have stronger value for individuals and 
communities thereby making them more likely to participate in social unrest. This lack of 
specificity regarding how resource scarcity’s impact on conflict processes is among the central 
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reasons why there is little consensus among neo-Malthusian scholars (Salehyan 2008; Gleditsch 
2012).15 
Second, conflict can result from environmentally-induced migration. Reuveny (2007) sets 
forth four causal mechanisms by which migration can result in violent conflict: competition for 
resources, ethnic tensions, and distrust among origin and host areas. Along this line of reasoning, 
Gleditsch et al. (2007) believe that refugees might bring organizational structures, social networks 
and ideas that can mitigate the probability of conflict. However, the climate-induced migration-
conflict relationship continues to be under-researched, particularly in large-N studies. 
There are two big gaps in the literature. The first deals with the focus on civil war as the 
sole outcome of the climate-conflict nexus. Storm surges, droughts, heatwaves and flooding are 
among the greatest threats to natural resources, particularly in developing countries. The fact that 
the climate is changing is hardly new. What is novel is how the interconnectedness between climate 
variability and human security may have already begun to emerge, albeit slowly. If governments 
fail to mitigate the various and complex effects of climate change, people will react—not always 
be peacefully. The civil war literature suggests that the short-term costs from climate change 
mainly results in displays of public discontent with the goal of taking over or changing the 
composition of the central government. However, in terms of resource scarcity, armed conflict 
further decreases resource availability rather than increase it (Maxwell & Reuveny 2000). Instead 
anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that in times of scarcity, public displace of discontent 
often take the form of protests, marches, riots and the like (Berazneva & Lee 2013). Whereas it is 
not always the case, recent history suggests that such low-intensity conflicts can escalate to full-
blown civil wars, as in the cases of Libya and Syria (2011), which resulted from the Arab Spring.  
                                                 
15
 For a more comprehensive review please refer to the Journal of Political Geography, Volume 26, Issue 6, August 
2007 and the Journal of Peace and Research, Volume 49, Issue 1, January 2012 for specific arguments on the topic. 
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Figure C. Climate-conflict nexus 
 
The second gap in the literature is the persistence in examining a direct climate-conflict 
relationship (Figure C). Most studies on climate & conflict assume that climate change influences 
other factors (e.g., economic growth, water & food scarcity, energy, etc.), which in turn lead to 
conflict. Bu this assumption has two caveats. First, this assumption falls prey to a one-size-fits-all 
approach that treats all risks factors equally. However, economic growth stagnation and water 
scarcity, for instance, have different causal mechanism that can lead to conflict. Second, 
correlations are not transitive (Gleditsch & Nordås 2014). A statistical correlation that establishes 
a link from A to B and from B to C is not sufficient to establish a link from A to C.16 Two recent 
studies using this two-stage approach find much support for the A to C link (Koubi et al. 2012 and 
Bergholt & Lujala 2012). 
To fill these gaps in the literature this dissertation: 1) uses low-intensity social conflicts as 
the principal outcome of interest, 2) it focuses specifically on the scarcity of basic resources as key 
risk factors for low-intensity conflict, and 3) rather than using a two-stage process, it directly tests 
the A(climate change)B(basic resources)C (social unrest) link. 
 
Climate variability, basic resources and social unrest: a theoretical framework 
  
Scarcity of a basic resource can occur at the household, city, regional, national, continental or 
global level. From country to country, the natural resource endowment determines how much a 
country can produce for its population. Institutions, primarily governments and their policies, 
                                                 
16 For example, assume that A= climate change, B= economic growth stagnation (or decline), and C= conflict. 
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formulate the systems that produce and distribute resources among the population, as well as 
export and import resources when there are excesses or shortages.  
The Global Footprint Network, an international think tank, measures the balance between 
how much people demand from nature (ecological footprint) and the capacity of ecosystems to 
regenerate what people demand from those surfaces (biocapacity).17 By their estimates, in 2015, 
Africa reached the point where it no longer had any biocapacity reserves left, but it had yet to 
experience a deficit in biocapacity. However, these calculations do not include the present and 
future impacts of climate and rainfall variability on the region’s biocapacity, which are expected 
to exacerbate the situation.  
However, as previously mentioned, increased environmental scarcity (or abundance) alone 
fails to account for short-term causes that “trigger” civil strife (Gleditsh 1998). As accurately 
pointed out by Hendrix & Glaser (2007:3), “environmental changes are so gradual that determining 
theoretical and empirical thresholds that, once crossed, trigger violence is extremely difficult.” De 
Soysa (2002) was among the first to test the causal links emanating from the neo-Malthusian 
literature.  Using a static operationalization of natural resource endowment, his findings suggest 
that armed conflict is more likely at both extremes: when renewable resources are very abundant 
or very scarce.  
A small number of indirect studies propose that rainfall variability affects armed conflict 
via economic growth. Miguel, Satyanath & Segenti (2004) find that in sub-Saharan Africa, wetter 
years are positively associated with income growth, and have a negative impact on the likelihood 
                                                 
17 The Global Footprint Network defines ecological footprint as “the area of land and water it takes for a human 
population to generate the renewable resources it consumes and to absorb the corresponding waste it generates, 
using prevailing technology. In other words, it measures the ‘quality of nature’ that we use and compares it with 
how much ‘nature we have.” Biocapacity is a measurement that determined how large the material metabolism of 
human economies is compared to what nature can renew. Further information is available at: 
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/ 
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of armed conflict. However, Koubi et al. (2012) find no statistically significant impact for the 
effect of climate variability on economic growth, despite the fact that economic growth in sub-
Saharan Africa has increased since the beginning of the 21st century (Cho & Bienvenue 2014). 
 
Economic grievances as “triggers” 
Economically, sub-Saharan Africa is not the same today as it was 25 years ago. For 
instance, the regions annual GDP growth was 1.6 percent in the 1990s, compared to the 5.1 percent 
growth in 2015—a trend that is expected to continue. Moreover, during the 1990s real GDP per 
capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) was $1,615, compared to $3,513 in 2015. This economic 
growth has helped alleviate poverty in the region, but this is not to say that sub-Saharan Africa is 
poverty free, in fact it remains the poorest region in the world.  
According to a 2016 World Bank report from household surveys, the proportion of people 
living below than the international poverty line of $1.90 a day, dropped from 57 percent in 1990 
to 43 percent in 2012 (Beegle et al. 2016).18 However, given the continuous population expansion 
in the region the number of people living below the poverty line increased by more than 100 
million (Ibid). By some estimates, about 15 percent of the region’s population was able to climb 
the socio-economic ladder over the last decade, a modest but significant achievement.19 The 
biggest shift occurred with people transitioning from extreme poverty (<$2.00 a day) towards low 
income ($2.01$10.00).  
While this shift is good news, it is also a frail development.  This “rising poor” segment is 
not to be confused with a middle class. Recent household-panel survey data indicates a substantial 
likelihood of falling back into poverty when individuals lack skills, education or assets (such as 
                                                 
18 In 2011 international purchasing power parity. 
19 Pew Research Center utilizes 2011 purchasing power parity dollars.  
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land) to sustain their economic level above the poverty threshold. What is more, these individuals 
are more likely to fall back into poverty “if they are hit by unemployment, illness, a disability, 
extreme climate events or conflict” (ODI 2014).  In a region where the majority of the population 
is employed by the agricultural sector—which in turn depends heavily on rainfall—climatic shocks 
have the potential to make people fall back into poverty. As described by Bates (1981), the issue 
that most frequently drives Africans to militant action is the erosion of their purchasing power.   
This argument hinges on two basic assumptions. First, despite the callousness of the assertion, 
people in extreme poverty ($2.00 or less) are, in a sense, used to living without being able to afford 
adequate nourishment. Second, this segment of the population is more likely to be targeted by 
domestic and international welfare programs aimed at reducing hunger. In other words, individuals 
who repeatedly lack food or water have adapted to their situation and cannot be mobilized to 
protest for two reasons. First, the loss of economic affluence is not a “trigger” among the poor, 
their likelihood of their participation in social unrest is low.20 Second, impoverished individuals 
should be less likely to partake in social unrest due to the various physiological effects of 
malnutrition.  
Thus, I argue that when climatic shocks occur and threaten economic prosperity, feelings 
of relative deprivation closely follow. On the one hand, feelings of relative deprivation can develop 
from inter-group, inter-individual or temporal comparisons (Sayles 1984). Inter-group and inter-
individual deprivation has its roots on comparisons made of a group´s or individual´s socio-
political and economic circumstances with those of more advantaged groups or individuals 
(inequality). On the other, feelings of relative deprivation can also steam from temporal changes 
in well-being (e.g., income) that generate a sense of harm (Hendrix & Haggard 2012). 
                                                 
20 Even though social unrest may be initiated by so-called “rising poor,” the extremely poor will surely follow suit 
should unrest continue. 
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Figure D. Theoretical approach for this research 
 
Figure D summarizes the causal mechanisms offered in this dissertation. When climate 
shocks occur, the capacity of basic resources like food, water, and grazing land can decline. After 
years of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, people’s expectations for well-being have 
steadily increased. Thus, when individual’s economic capabilities are not able to keep up or even 
decline as a result of climate shocks, feelings of economic frustration can motivate individuals to 
exhibit aggressive behavior that can culminate in social unrest. In effect, those individuals who 
were able to improve their economic situation will fear falling back into poverty.  
While poverty, inequality, social exclusion, and other sources of grievances are present in 
most societies, not every country experiences episodes of conflict. However, access to basic 
resources such as water and food are fundamental needs for human survival. Moreover, the 
agriculture sector employs up to 60 percent of Africa’s labor force. Thus, a good harvest provides 
income security for many. Because climate shocks result in a sudden reversal of fortunes, we can 
expect individuals that have risen out of poverty and fear falling back into it, to develop a sense of 
relative deprivation that will incentivize them to participate in low-intensity forms of social unrest.  
To summarize, I argue that when those who have modest economic means to secure 
renewable resources fail to do so—either because of poor institutional access or as a result of 
climate shocks that limit them— will experience intensified feelings of temporal deprivation 
toward the state that can lead towards social unrest participation. Consequently, it is not the poorest 
of the poor who are most likely to participate in low-intensity social unrest, but rather those who 
over the last 20 years have managed to climb the economic ladder.  
 
Climate
shocks
Scarcity of basic 
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Low-intensity unrest
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Institutions matter 
It is important to mention that not every case of scarcity results in conflict. Giordano et al. (2005) 
argue that limiting the debate to demand- or supply-induced scarcity is too narrow. The authors 
do not deny the importance and potential effects of resource scarcity; however, their primary 
focus is to examine whether countries with poor institutions are at greater risk of international 
conflict. However, weak institutions do not only increase the risk of international conflict, but 
also have an important role to play in preventing conflicts within countries (Bennett et al. 2001; 
Elhawary 2007). When food prices rise, for example, socioeconomic and political grievances 
exacerbate a general sentiment that the government has failed. Availability and affordability of 
basic resources is an unequivocally essential aspect of the social contract between constituents 
and political leaders. Therefore, declines in renewables have a clear political consequence.  
 Political institutions play an important role. On the one hand, governments can embrace 
market liberalization in a relatively comprehensive and sustained manner, with intervention mostly 
limited to regulating the playing field, investing in infrastructure, encouraging diversification of 
food consumption patterns, and principally relying on private trade to stabilize prices (Jayne et al. 
2010; Gouel 2013). On the other, governments can implement a more partial liberalization process, 
in which the private sector operates but governments also intervene in food markets, mainly 
through marketing boards and discretionary trade policy tools such as export bans, changes in 
import tariff rates, and direct government importation (Minot 2014). Chapoto and Jayne (2009) 
argue that countries that embracing market liberalization (e.g., Mozambique and Senegal) are more 
likely to increase food production, whereas countries whose governments directly intervene (e.g., 
Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya) have had a stagnant food production sector. While in fact 
government intervention can stagnate food production, such intervention can also mitigate food-
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related social unrest. For instance, during the 2007−2008 food riots Mozambique and Senegal 
experienced food riots while Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya did not (Berazneva & Lee 2011). 
Moreover, political institutions can play an important role in the mitigation of conflict, 
particularly non-violent conflict. Two dominant approaches address the question of different 
levels of coercion and popular protest: the inverted-U hypothesis and the backlash hypothesis. 
The first view argues that lower levels of repression open new opportunities for challengers to 
collectively act to make claims against the state (Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994). 
Eisinger (1973) sought to explain why some U.S. cities experienced riots during the 1960s while 
others did not. Focusing on the “openness” of urban governments that allowed for more 
conventional ways to expose grievances, he found that by being more accessible (open) towards 
individuals expressing their discontent, cities could discourage social unrest, while cities with 
less access for constituents to express grievances experienced more unrest. Five years later, Tilly 
(1978) built on Eisinger’s work by making national comparisons. Both scholars support the 
relationship between political opportunity and social unrest to be a curvilinear one. On one side, 
“open” regimes provide frequent access to their constituents to express their grievances vis-à-vis 
institutions; this allows for the prospect of social unrest to become less appealing given that less 
costly venues exist to achieve their goals. In other words, democratic countries have strong 
institutions where public officials are more likely to mitigate and respond to constituent 
grievances; however, when these mechanisms fail, protests, riots and demonstrations serve as 
counteractive responses. On the other end of the curve, “closed” regimes tend to be highly 
repressive and usually prevent their citizens from developing the organizational means to express 
their grievances. They are also less inclined to observe citizens creating disruption in the streets. 
Such repression deters popular mobilization and stifles it should it occur (Goodwin 2001). In 
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light of these two extremes, social unrest occurs when there is space for tolerance by a polity and 
when individuals are neither sufficiently free to make regular claims, nor so repressed as to 
prevent them from trying to do so.  
The second approach claims the opposite; repression, in fact, facilitates social unrest. 
While some scholars claim that repression can dissipate mobilization efforts (Zwerman et al. 
2000), others argue that repression can lead to new mobilization via backlash events that foster 
a collective sense of “defiance and increase organizational solidarity among diverse and loosely 
connected movements” (Stockemer 2012: 205; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996; Brocket 1995; Choi 
1999).  When elites use repressive techniques to diffuse mobilization, these techniques 
sometimes fail and backfire, opening political opportunities for mobilization. A backlash can 
occur around police brutality or media censorship or other kinds of repressive events that are 
perceived as unjust and can generate public outrage without necessarily being directly linked to 
collective action (Hess & Martin 2006). However, two conditions must be met for a repressive 
event to generate a backlash. First, the audience must perceive the event to be unjust and second, 
information about the event must be broadly communicated to targeted audiences that are 
substantial enough for public officials to take their outrage into consideration.  
       Figure E. Sub-Saharan Africa: Regimes by Type, 19602015. 
 
      Source: POLITY IV 
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As depicted in Figure E, hybrid regimes have been the dominant regime type in sub-
Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War. According to the typology of authoritarian regimes 
developed by Barbara Geddes (1991), the region is plagued by so-called personalist regimes.21 
Personalist regimes tend to have narrow support bases (Geddes 1991, 1999). In order to sustain 
the longevity of the regime, personalist leaders distribute benefits and patronage to their support 
bases in order to appease them and avoid challenges to the regime, often disenfranchising and 
provoking excluded elite groups and the general population. Therefore, those excluded from the 
leader’s benefits are more likely to challenge the regime, even when the penalty for unsuccessful 
attempts may be high.  
With this in mind, I argue that there are two key reasons why hybrid regimes are more 
likely to experience protest when renewable resources decrease. First, most hybrid regimes have 
institutions and elections similar to those in democracies. These institutions allow for citizens’ 
grievances to be voiced while strategically allowing the formation of some opposition groups 
and political parties that can help sustain an illusion of control and progress. This signals to the 
citizenry that dissent is tolerated and in some cases, concessions from the government are not 
far-fetched.  
Second, because the survival of political leaders in personalist regimes is dependent on 
the distribution of benefits and patronage to their support base, political leaders in these regimes 
are more vulnerable to economic and external shocks that reduce the amount of benefits available 
to distribute (Bates 1981; Geddes 1991, 1999).  Therefore, in times of renewable resource 
shortages from climatic shocks, political leaders will ration renewable resources in order to shield 
                                                 
21 Regimes where political leaders successfully draw support from the organization that brought them to power 
while limiting their supporters’ influence on policy and personal decisions (Geddes 1991). 
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their support base from scarcity and its harmful outcomes. By doing this, political leaders are 
able to appease their support base and avoid challenges to the regime, giving no systematic 
preference to the rest of the population.  
However, when climatic anomalies disrupt the supply of a renewable resource such as 
water or food, the demand of that renewable remains constant, or in some cases, increases. 
Therefore, when climatic shocks occur and political leaders ration, structural scarcity is 
exacerbated, further limiting the accessibility of resources to consumers (Homer-Dixon & Blitt 
1998). When restrictions on renewable resources increase, deepened economic grievances can 
heighten and trigger episodes of social unrest. 
 
Alternative argument: Technological innovation  
 
Economic optimists argue that, in response to profit opportunities, entrepreneurs will develop new 
technologies to prevent scarcity of renewable resources. Human ingenuity is commonly portrayed 
as the savior that will introduce technological innovations to mitigate scarcity. An often cited 
example is the development of crop breeding technologies that increased per-acre grain production 
and sparked the Green Revolution of the 1960s. To be able to feed a growing global population on 
a warming planet, we will need a second Green Revolution. There are two competing approaches 
on how to successfully achieve this goal. The first approach advocates to continuing and improving 
work on crop genetic techniques to design drought- and flood-resistant crops. The second approach 
champions a more organic approach: crop rotation. Planting a greater variety of crops adds 
nutrients to the soil, decreases pest cycles (reducing pesticides use), and helps to mitigate the 
effects of erratic climate when farmers do not depend on a single crop. A more nutrient-rich soil 
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and a lower pest cycles has been shown to increase crop production in some sub-Saharan countries 
(TerAvest et al. 2015). 
While crop rotation may be a more economically viable option for small-scale farmers in 
sub-Saharan Africa, anecdotal evidence suggests that most African governments currently favor 
new crop modification technologies. In 2015, only Burkina Faso, South Africa, Egypt and Sudan 
had released genetically modified crops in to their national markets.  However, because most 
African countries lack the necessary technological ingenuity to develop these technologies 
themselves, their acquisition is largely dependent on for-profit corporations.22 Once the 
technologies are successfully introduced into national markets, farmers can purchase the seeds. 
However, to sustain profits, most corporations require farmers to sing agreements stipulating that 
they cannot save and replant seeds produced from the purchased seeds. Therefore, seeds must be 
purchased on a yearly basis.  
Deploying new agricultural tools to sub-Saharan Africa has two downsides. First, 
genetically modified seeds tend to be more expensive than non-genetically modified seeds. On 
average, farming households have an annual income of $2,989 and an average of six people per 
household. By contrast, non-farm workers have, on average, smaller household sizes and twice the 
income (Tortora 2014). Second, these technologies have begun to fail, sparking concerns about 
how else these technologies may fall short. For instance, corn rootworms have begun to adjust and 
weeds have become more resistant to pesticides (Royte 2013). There is no doubt that an African 
Green Revolution is in the works. What form it will take remains to be seen. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Ingenuity is defined as ideas applied to solve a practical social and technical problems (Homer-Dixon 1995). 
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Research Expectations 
 
 
I borrow from the literature on conflict and environmental security and apply it to determine 
whether scarcity of basic resources, caused by climate change, has already begun to negatively 
impact social cohesion in sub-Saharan Africa. I have three key expectations for this research. First,  
in order to gauge if a two-track scenario between structural & supply-induced scarcity is now 
unfolding, the first empirical chapter tests for structural-induced scarcity. I then examine for a 
supply-induced scarcity and its potential effect of two distinct types of low-intensity forms of 
social unrest: peaceful & violent unrest and communal violence. I expect that the introduction of 
an interaction variable to the climate-conflict nexus will help clarify the causal mechanism that 
scarcity of resources from climate change can lead to various conflict processes. If it is the case 
that climate change has begun to negatively impact resource scarcity, and in turn, that scarcity 
increases the likelihood of low-intensive forms of unrest, several policy implications will be 
suggested. 
Second, I expect wealthier countries to be more likely to experience social unrest. Bearing 
in mind the economic prosperity of the region that has lifted millions of out poverty since the turn 
on the century, I believe that when climate shocks befall economic grievances arise and/or 
intensify as a result of temporal changes in income. Finally, I expect hybrid regimes who 
selectively tolerate public displays of dissent against the regime to be more likely to experience 
social unrest. It has been suggested that among the reasons why hybrid regimes tolerate dissent is 
to collect information about the citizenry who would otherwise may fear speaking against the state 
(Wintrobe 1998). In other words, dictators can never truly know what their subjects think of them 
(Hendrix et al. 2009). Because of this, rulers in hybrid regimes tend to rely on the support of a 
narrow base of followers who receive preferential treatment in times of instability as well as punish 
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defection. For instance, during the ongoing 2016 drought facing Zimbabwe, President Mugabe 
made good on his threat to take farm land from party defectors. The seized land given to party 
loyalists, citing the need to expand crop production (Onishi 2015). All hypotheses and main 
dependent variables are displayed in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1—Summary of hypotheses  
Chapter Hypotheses  Testing for/Dependent variable  
 
Three 
H1: People who go without enough water or food will 
be more likely to protest, compared to those who report 
otherwise.  
 
H1a: People who seldom go without water or food will 
be more likely to protest, compared to those who always 
go without these basic needs. 
 
H2: People who report being employed in any sector of 
the economy, compared to those who report being 
unemployed, will be more likely to protest when access 
to food or water is limited. 
 
 
Structural-induced scarcity 
Outcome: protest participation 
 
Four 
 
H1: The interaction between extreme deviations from 
average rainfall patterns and cereal yields should be 
associated with an increase in the frequency of violent 
and peaceful unrest. 
 
H2: The interaction between extreme deviations from 
average temperature patterns and cereal yields should be 
associated with an increase in the frequency of violent 
and peaceful unrest. 
 
Supply-induced scarcity 
Outcome: peaceful & violent unrest 
 
 
Five 
 
H1: Land degradation should be positively associated to 
the frequency of communal violence. 
 
H2: Precipitation deviations from average patterns 
should increase the frequency of communal violence. 
 
H3: The interaction of extreme deviations from average 
rainfall patterns and land degradation should be 
associated with an increase in the frequency of 
communal violence. 
 
H4: Above-average temperature years should increase 
the frequency of communal violence. 
 
H5: The interaction between above-average temperature 
years and land degradation should be associated with an 
increase in the frequency of communal violence.  
 
 
Supply-induced scarcity 
Outcome: communal violence 
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Since record keeping began fifteen of the sixteen warmest years in the planet have occurred 
since 2001, with 2016 predicted to be the warmest yet. Finding that climate change has already 
begun to negatively impact basic resources, and as a result of that scarcity, increased the frequency 
of low-intensity conflict can have significant impacts for scholars and policy makers alike. If neo-
Malthusian scholars are correct, a warmer planet could mean less resources for a growing 
population over the next 25 years. With this in mind, one important question is raised: will conflict 
become the new normal in resource scarce societies? 
Each of the following chapters addresses different pathways by which scarcity of basic 
resources can spark social unrest. Chapter three begins with an analysis of structural-induced 
scarcity of food and water at the micro-level, and potential triggers conducive towards popular 
protest.  Shifting towards a more state-centric approach, chapter four examines whether 
temperature and precipitation anomalies have begun to negatively impact crop yields, and in turn, 
this scarcity increased the frequency of violent and peaceful unrest. The fifth chapter examines the 
potential role of precipitation and temperature anomalies on communal violence via land 
degradation in sub-Saharan Africa, where state institutions are unable to reach in order to mitigate 
conflict episodes. 
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THREE 
 
ACCESS TO BASIC RESOURCES AND POPULAR PROTEST 
 
 
Access to water and food across sub-Saharan Africa lags behind all other regions in the world. 
While this phenomenon is not a recent development, the 20072008 and 2011 spikes in food 
prices, which culminated in demonstrations and riots throughout 48 countries across the world, 
have invigorated the debate regarding food prices and social unrest (Weinberg & Bakker 2014; 
Bellemare 2014). However, much of the current research on access to basic resources is limited in 
two ways. First, current arguments have focused mostly on food access while largely ignoring 
access to clean water for household use. Second, academic research has failed to incorporate access 
to basic resources such as food and water into the literature on protest participation. This research 
addresses these gaps within the literature.  
 This chapter makes two contributions to the literature on food insecurity and protest 
participation. First, it uses a broad measurement that incorporates all aspects that can limit access, 
not only price increases. This is done to better grasp whether overall poor access to food and water 
can be good motivators for participation in social unrest. Previous literature examining this nexus 
has largely focused on food prices as the main motivation for protest participation (van Weezel 
2013; Smith 2014). Second, this research builds on previous literature by investigating the 
relationship between protest participation and access to food and water by using three cross-
national Afrobarometer surveys. Doing this allows for a more precise way to gauge whether 
changes in access to food or water within countries influenced protest participation at three distinct 
points in time. 
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Access denied 
Africa is home to some of the most water-deprived and nutritionally insecure people in the world. 
UN-Water defines water security as when “populations have access to safe, sufficient and 
affordable water to meet basic needs for drinking, sanitation and hygiene, to safeguard health and 
well-being, and to fulfill basic human rights (WWAP 2015).” However, in sub-Saharan Africa, 30 
percent of the total population does not have adequate access to an improved source of drinking 
water (WWAP 2015).23 Similarly, about 20 percent of the region’s population is undernourished.24 
The FAO defines food security “as a situation when all people, at all times, have the physical, 
social and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
preferences for an active and healthy life.”25  
 Access to a basic resource such as water or food has four dimensions: economic, physical, 
socio-political and climatic. The economic dimension refers to the ability of individuals or 
households from being unable to purchase water, food, or the necessary items to produce enough 
food, as well as the presence or absence of social safety nets that can provide such access for those 
who could not otherwise do so (Hendrix & Brinkman 2013). The physical dimension can be 
explained by a situation where food is poorly distributed from one part of the country to another 
due to poor infrastructure such as storage facilities, roads, port facilities and the like. As shown in 
table 3.1, Africa lacks a robust transportation infrastructure. The percentage of paved roads out of 
the total road network is lower in most sub-Saharan African countries than in any other region in 
the world (World Bank, 2013a).  
 
 
                                                 
23 World Bank Indicators, 2015 [improved water source] at:  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.SAFE.ZS  
24 World Bank Indicators, 2015 [prevalence of undernourishment] at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SN.ITK.DEFC.ZS  
25 For more information, please visit: http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/en/  
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Table 3.1 Infrastructure in selected African countries 
 Paved roads 
over total 
roads (%) 
Road density 
(per 100 km2 
of land area) 
Rail lines density 
(per 100 km2 of 
land area) 
Benin 9.5 (2004) 16.6 (2004) 0.7 (2008) 
Botswana 32.6 (2005) 4.4 (2005) 0.2 (2012) 
Burkina Faso 20.6 (2011) 5.6 (2011) 0.2 (2012) 
Burundi 10.4 (2004) 44.3 (2004) n/a 
Cameroon 10.1 (2010) 10.5 (2010) 0.2 (2012) 
Chad 1.0 (2000) 3.1 (2006) n/a 
Congo 7.1 (2009) 5.0 (2009) 0.2 (2007) 
DRC 1.8 (2004) 6.5 (2004) 0.2 (2012) 
Ethiopia 13.7 (2007) 4.0 (2007) 0.1 (1991) 
Gabon 12.0 (2007) 3.4 (2007) 0.3 (2012) 
Ghana 12.6 (2008) 45.9 (2009) 0.4 (2008) 
Kenya 7.0 (2011) 27.7 (2011) 0.3 (2006) 
Madagascar 16.3 (2011) 6.4 (2011) 0.1 (2008) 
Nigeria 15.0 (2004) 20.9 (2004) 0.4 (2007) 
Niger 20.6 (2008) 1.5 (2010) n/a 
Tanzania 14.9 (2009) 9.1 (2011) 0.3 (2006) 
       Source: World Development Indicators 
 
The socio-political dimension exists when the physical and economic components are 
present but people are deprived from accessing enough food or water. For instance, this deprivation 
can result from poor government policies that interfere with markets, inhibit trade and discourage 
farmers from expanding production. Similarly, corruption can limit access to these necessities. In 
many sub-Saharan countries, government officials often profit by selling grain reserves to a 
middlemen, who then sells the grain to the local markets at higher prices, making it less affordable 
for consumers.26 Furthermore, access can be limited based on the identification with a particular 
social group or gender.  For example, a recent empirical study conducted in southwestern Ethiopia, 
for example, revealed that girls were more likely than boys to be undernourished in food-insecure 
households (Hadley et al. 2008).  
Erratic climatic conditions are the final dimension than can limit access to food and water. 
Drought or flooding conditions can temporarily decrease the amount of food available at the local, 
                                                 
26 Corruption’s role in Kenyan food crisis: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9624731.stm  
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regional or national level, making food scarcer. Similarly, when precipitation is lower than average 
for long periods of time, the flow of streams and rivers declines, water level in lakes and reservoirs 
falls, and the depth of water wells increases. Thus, when dry conditions persist, water supply can 
temporarily decrease access to water for large segments of the population. In a region where 
hundreds of thousands often go without enough food to eat and clean water for household use, 
what, if any, are the social consequences? 
 
The micro consequences of poor access to water and food 
Do people protest when poor access to food and water occurs? Anecdotal evidence from across 
the world suggests that they do. In 2007, hundreds of farmers protested in several rural districts of 
West Bengal, India, over a shortage of food brought on by extensive corruption in the food 
distribution system. According to India’s Central Bank, about 28 percent of the population in West 
Bengal lived below the poverty line in 2011—a number that climbed to 36% by 2013.27 To 
improve food access in the region, the central government allowed private vendors to sell heavily 
subsidized food to the rural population. The entire distribution system is controlled by politically 
supported private contractor, which often leads to high levels of corruption. According to a 
government-sanctioned report, most of the rural poor in the area were not receiving regular 
supplies of the food to which they are entitled—only six percent of poor villagers received their 
rations. The report further found that about 35 percent of rice and 87 percent of wheat meant to be 
delivered to the region got diverted into open markets or stolen. As a result of the scheme, rural 
dwellers who were able to pay were paying higher prices for low quality-food. 
                                                 
27Reserve Bank of India. 2011-2013.  "Number and Percentage of Population Below Poverty Line” Retrieved [July 
19, 2016] at: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=15283  
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 Poor access to water can also result in episodes of social unrest. In February 2016, 
protesters in Modimolle, South Africa, a town of about 40,000 residents located 115 miles away 
from Johannesburg, took to the streets to demonstrate their anger over a four-month shortage of 
water in the area. Local newspapers reported that protesters had complained for months to the 
authorities, who ignored their complaints about the lack of piped water and the poor quality of the 
water being delivered to them by tankers (Fuku 2016). Residents were further incensed by 
accusations that the local government had been discriminating against the poor when it was 
discovered that suburban residents in the area were receiving clean water from the government. 
Most recently, evidence from Venezuela shows how poor government policies can turn 
into a full-blown food crisis. The 2014 drop in oil prices, which account for almost half of the 
country’s export income, the government has been unable to produce or import enough food for 
the country.  As predicted by the law of supply and demand, food scarcity saw prices skyrocket to 
the point that 72 percent of monthly wages are being spent on food (Casey 2016). As a result, 
peaceful and violent protest events have become all too common in the streets of major cities 
around the country. 
 While these cases may appear isolated (and in some occasions extreme), they corroborate 
the theory that limited access to basic needs such as food and water can increase the likelihood of 
social unrest events. But under what conditions? Poor access to a basic resource can lead to acute 
or chronic food or water insecurity. Acute insecurity refers to the temporary gaps in access that 
result from the collapse of any of the four dimensions that lead to access: economic, physical, 
socio-political and climatic. By contrast, chronic insecurity is a constant lack of sufficient and safe 
food or water to maintain a healthy and active lifestyle and is mostly caused by extreme poverty. 
As shown in table 3.2, data from the last four Afrobarometer survey rounds indicate around half 
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of the sampled population had, at least once, gone without enough food to eat or without enough 
clean water for household use during the previous year. Undoubtedly, poor access to food and 
water is the most basic form of deprivation that can be experienced by any person, but is this 
limitation of access enough to motivate protest participation? All three anecdotal cases presented 
above have one thing in common: the realization that an injustice was being committed by the 
governments, either by creating it or failing to prevent it. In most cases, the decline in access to 
food or water often resulted in people having to spend even more of their income to bridge the 
gap, and few things drive people to militant action more than the erosion of their purchasing power 
(Bates 1981). 
 
Table 3.2 Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without enough 
[water/food]? (%) 
 2005/2006 
(Round 3) 
2008/2009 
(Round 4) 
2011/2013 
(Round 5) 
2014/2015 
(Round 6) 
Food     
Never 46.7 43.9 46.6 53.0 
At least once  53.0 56.0 53.3 46.9 
Missing/unknown 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Water     
Never 51.7 51.7 49.5 54.4 
  At least once 48.1 48.2 50.3 45.6 
Missing/unknown 0.2 0.1 0.2 - 
Source: Afrobarometer28  
 
Popular protests do not occur by chance. Protests are not the result of a curious planetary 
alignment; rather, individuals choose to participate in them. For some time, scholars have 
suggested that poverty (Collier et al. 2003), lack of schooling (Collier 2000; Brett & Specht 2004), 
and unemployment (Goldstone 1991, 2001) are strong stimuli for an individual’s motivation to 
participate in civil strife. However, these mechanisms remain empirically unclear at the micro-
                                                 
28Afrobarometer Data, Rounds 36, 20052015, is available at: http://www.afrobarometer.org. Samples usually 
include either 1,200 or 2,400 cases.  A randomly selected sample of n=1200 cases allows inferences to national adult 
populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than +/-2.8% with a confidence level of 95 percent.  With a 
sample size of n=2400, the margin of error decreases to +/-2.0% at a 95 percent confidence level. 
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level and require further examination, particularly in Africa (see Justino 2009 for mixed micro-
level evidence). The first task here is to find whether a statistical relationship exists between poor 
access to food and water and protest participation. Because poor access to basic resources is the 
most basic form of deprivation, I argue that when individuals have experience limited access that 
threatens their livelihoods, feelings of relative deprivation closely follow. Particularly those 
feelings rooted in inter-group and inter-individual comparisons (Sayles 1984). Therefore, to test 
this I hypothesize that: 
 
H1: People who go without enough water or food will be more likely to protest, compared to 
those who report otherwise. 
 
 
The second task is to examine which individuals, if any, are more likely to protest: those 
who seldom go without access or those who constantly do so. Theoretically, people who report 
always going without food or water suffer from chronic insecurity due to extreme poverty. I argue 
that chronically insecure people should be less likely to protest than acutely insecure people. This 
argument hinges on two basic assumptions. First, despite the callousness of the assertion, people 
in extreme poverty ($2.00 or less per day) are, in a sense, more used to living without being able 
to afford adequate nourishment. Second, this segment of the population is more likely to be 
targeted by domestic and international welfare programs aimed at reducing hunger. In other words, 
individuals who normally lack food or water have adapted to their situation and cannot be as 
mobilized to protest. That is to say, impoverished individuals should be less likely to partake in 
social unrest due to the various physiological effects of malnutrition. Thus, the following corollary 
hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H1a: People who seldom go without water or food will be more likely to protest, compared to 
those who always go without these basic needs. 
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The final task is to gauge whether economic grievances play a role in protest participation. 
The opportunity cost model suggests that participation in social unrest should decrease as incomes 
rise; essentially, participation is regarded as a problem of unemployment. However, recent 
literature on popular protest in Africa finds that employed individuals have more to lose by not 
participating (Snow & Oliver 1995; Van Zomeren et al. 2008). In a region where households spend 
a high percentage of their income on basic needs, fluctuations in access to water or food are often 
accompanied by the need to spend even more income to acquire such resources. For instance, in 
2008, Algerians, Cameroonians, Kenyans, Nigerians and South Africans spent 43%, 40%, 44%, 
40% and 20% of their total annual incomes on food, respectively.29 Therefore, one should expect 
individuals who are accustomed to a stable increase in their wellbeing by being employed to be 
the first to take to the streets when poor access to food or water diminishes, rather than those who 
have nothing to lose. The reason for this is that those individuals with a stable (or improved) 
economic situation will fear poverty (or falling back into poverty). Thus, I hypothesize that: 
 
H2: People who report being employed in any sector of the economy, compared to those who 
report being unemployed, will be more likely to protest when access to food or water is 
limited. 
 
 
Research Design  
I test my hypotheses using survey data from three distinct Afrobarometer surveys. The summary 
of main sample statistics is displayed in table 3.3. Overall, the sample includes data from almost 
86,000 respondents from sub-Saharan Africa between 2005 and 2013. Afrobarometer surveys have 
increased the number of countries included with every passing round; therefore, not every country 
                                                 
29
 USDA/Economic Research Service, 2008. 
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appears in every wave. I examine 18 countries from the third round (20052006), 20 countries 
from the fourth round (20082009), and 29 countries from the fifth round (20112013). Each 
survey round is examined independently to better gauge all dimensions that can lead to poor access  
Table 3.3 Summary of main sample statistics 
     Mean  SD  Min  Max          
Round 3 
 
Protest/march attendance   0.13  0.34  0  1 
Food access     1.11  1.25  0  4  
Water access    1.13  1.38  0  4 
Employment status   0.59  0.83  0  2  
Membership association  0.46  0.84  0  3  
Interest in public affairs   1.86  1.08  0  3  
Regime     1.16  0.55  0  2   
Age     36.62  14.81  18  130   
Gender     0.50  0.50  0  1  
Education    3.140  1.99  0  9  
Urban dweller    0.38  0.48  0  1 
 
Round 4 
 
Protest/march attendance   0.12  0.33  0  1 
Food access     1.14  1.22  0  4  
Water access    1.07  1.32  0  4 
Employment status   0.52  0.78  0  2  
Membership association  0.67  0.95  0  3  
Interest in public affairs   1.76  1.11  0  3  
Regime     1.21  0.56  0  2   
Age     36.33  14.50  18  110   
Gender     0.49  0.50  0  1  
Education    3.14  2.02  0  9  
Urban dweller    0.37  0.48  0  1 
 
Round 5 
 
Protest/march attendance   0.08  0.28  0  1 
Food access     1.12  1.23  0  4  
Water access    1.19  1.38  0  4 
Employment status   0.32  0.46  0  1  
Membership association  0.67  0.96  0  3  
Interest in public affairs   1.65  1.11  0  3  
Regime     1.11  0.53  0  2   
Age     37.08  14.61  18  105   
Male     0.49  0.50  0  1  
Education    3.20  2.06  0  9  
Urban dweller    0.37  0.48  0  1 
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to water or food without over estimating the spike in food prices during 20082009 and 2011. To 
analyze the relationship between access to food or water and protest participation, I use a logistic 
regression, given the binary nature of the dependent variable, and multilevel random effects given 
that the data are based on survey responses of individuals nested within countries. This method 
allows me to control for cross-country variance and to correct for clustering in the data.  
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is protest participation. It is important to note that the dependent variable 
is not only limited to food or water riots, which is admittedly a limitation of this study. Given the 
complexly interwoven socio-political, physical, economic and climatic factors and access to food 
and water, the dependent variable encompasses all types of protest. Building on previous research, 
protest participation is a binary variable coded 1 for individuals who report having attended a 
protest or a march during the previous year, and 0 if otherwise. Figures FH display a comparison 
of protest occurrence by country in each Afrobarometer sample used in this study.30 
  Figures FH. Total protest occurrence by country: Afrobarometer rounds 35 
 
                                                 
30 All Afrobarometer questions and the coding scheme used are located in the appendix. 
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Independent variables  
The main independent variables are access to food and water. Access to each resource is coded 
from 0 to 4, where the lowest number represents people who report never going without water or 
food. The highest number reflects those who report always going without enough water or food. 
This variable is labeled “access to basic need.” I expect the coefficient of both independent 
variables to be positive and significant, indicating that, ceteris paribus, people with limited access 
to food or water are more likely to protest than those with uninterrupted access. 
Another variable of interest is employment status. Afrobarometer respondents are not 
asked to report their income, due to the high number of individuals who operate in informal 
networks where cash transactions are unrecorded and difficult to measure (Bratton 2008). 
Therefore, employment status is used to account for peoples’ economic condition for two reasons. 
First, people who report being employed, regardless of employment sector, are more likely to have 
a steady income source and therefore a better opportunity to purchase water and food. Second, 
contrary to the literature on protest participation that suggests that employed individuals are less 
likely to protest,31 I argue, as others have before me, that employed individuals are more likely to 
                                                 
31 The literature suggests two reasons for this. First, employed individuals have less free time. Second, employed 
individuals may be unwilling to risk their employment situation given the potential risks associated with participation 
(e.g., arrest) (McAdam 1986; DiPasquale & Glaeser 1996). 
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protest for two reasons. First, when water and food prices increase due to poor access, employed 
individuals become fearful of being unable to adequately provide for themselves and/or their 
household if they fall (or fall back) into poverty.32 Second, workers are more likely to belong to 
civic organizations, workers’ unions or farmers’ associations, which allows for the spread of 
grievances among like-minded people (Bratton et al. 2005).  
Several controls are included in the analysis. First, I control for four individual factors: 
education, age, gender and residential location (urban or rural). A plethora of U.S. studies have 
linked education to increased political participation. Empirical studies suggest that education is 
positively associated with political participation (Verba et al. 1995; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). 
However, the relationship between education and political participation is less established in 
Africa (see Bratton et al. 2005; Kuenzi 2006; Dionne et al. 2014). To avoid the possibility of 
omitted variable bias, I control for education in the analysis.  
Age has been found to be a strong determinant of participation in protest and broader 
variations of social unrest, including armed conflict (Wiltfang & McAdam 1991; Goldstone 2001; 
Urdal 2014). Young people, particularly the poor and unemployed, have been shown to be more 
prone to join armed groups as an alternative way to generate income (Collier 2000), among other 
reasons. Theoretically, young people have fewer of the time constraints usually associated with 
full-time employment and family responsibilities. Therefore, I expect young individuals to be 
negatively associated with protest participation. 
The literature on political violence (Mesquida & Wiener 1996; Elbadawi & Sambanis 
2000), as well as that on criminal violence (Neapolitan 1997; Neumayer 2003), has embraced the 
notion that men are more likely to participate in acts of violence than are women. It has been 
                                                 
32
 This does not imply that poor people are excluded from protest participation or that they do not join the middle 
class in protesting for a perceived public good. 
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proposed that young men are more hostile due to high testosterone levels (Goldstein 2001; Hudson 
& den Boer 2004). However, in sub-Saharan Africa, women provide most of the labor in collecting 
water, dominate the agricultural sector and carry primary responsibily for raising children. They 
are therefore more likely to be highly sensitive to changes in food and water access.  As a result, I 
do not have any expectations regarding the directionality of this variable. To control for gender, a 
binary variable indicating whether the respondent is a man or a woman is coded 1 or 0 respectively.  
Urban dwellers ought to be more affected by poor access to food and water, given their 
greater dependence on income to make ends meet and compared to rural dwellers who can directly 
access water and food from or around their land. Moreover, city-life proximity helps to spread 
emotions of anger and frustration, intensifies these feelings, and allows them to linger longer in 
the mind of individuals through constant reinforcement (Jasper 2007). I expect urban dwellers to 
be more likely to protest than their rural counterparts, since mobilization is easier in densely 
populated areas (Bates 1981; Bratton et al. 2005). 
Second, I include two controls for an individual’s civic interest: membership in a civic 
association or community group and an individual’s interest in public affairs. Baron A. Putnam 
(2000: 35) argues that political knowledge and interest are “critical preconditions for active forms 
of participation.” Individual awareness of one’s political surroundings has been empirically 
suggested to increase propensity to participate in protests (Verba et al. 1995).  Individuals who are 
interested in politics are more likely to be aware of the perils facing their communities, and 
therefore more likely to respond to potential rising threats, by participating in political activities, 
including protests (Schussman & Soule 2005). It has also been postulated that individual 
participation in a civic association has a twofold effect on the likelihood of protest participation. 
First, it leads individuals to have an emotional attachment to the group and to develop a “collective 
51 
 
group identity.” This group identity serves as a strong motivator to act on behalf of the group, 
including an obligation to protest (Polletta & Jasper 2001; Opp 2012). Second, it has been 
empirically proposed that group organizations facilitate the successful allocation of resources 
required for mobilization (McCarthy & Zald 1977; Aslaidis 2012).   
Finally, to control for structural opportunities, a measurement of regime openness is 
included in the analysis. The impact of regime openness is described as an inverted U-shaped form. 
More open (or democratic) political systems and strongly closed political systems are less likely 
to experience popular mobilization, due to their tolerance for dissent and for fear of reprisals, 
respectively (Tarrow 1994; Hegre et al. 2001). To control for the inverted-U hypothesis, I include 
the respondents’ evaluation of their political system.  
 
Results and discussion   
Table 3.4 reports the coefficients for the effect that access (or lack thereof) to food or water have 
on an individual’s likelihood to protest in sub-Saharan Africa. For ease of interpretation, the results 
are presented as logged odds, which is estimated by exponentiating the constant term. The results 
clearly support the main hypothesis (H1) that people who go without enough water or food are 
more prone to participate in protest. With a one-unit increase in poor access to food, the odds of 
protest participation increase by a factor of 1.05 (round 3), 1.07 (round 4), and 1.06 (round 5), 
holding all other variables at their mean value. Food access is statistically significant across all 
models at p<0.01. Similiarly, with a one-unit increase in poor access to water, the odds of protest 
participation increases by a factor of 1.04 (round 3), 1.06 (round 4), and 1.03 (round 5), holding 
all other variables constant. Water access is statistically significant at p<0.05 in round 3 and p<0.01 
in rounds four and five. 
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            Round 3       Round 4       Round 5 
         20052006    20082009    20112013 
 Food 
(1) 
Water 
(2) 
Food 
(3) 
Water 
(4) 
Food 
(5) 
Water 
(6) 
       
Access to basic need 0.052*** 0.039** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.066*** 0.038*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
Employment status 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.066*** 0.062** 0.059 0.052 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038) (0.038) 
Member of organization 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.468*** 0.467*** 0.376*** 0.377*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
Interest in public affairs 0.266*** 0.263*** 0.214*** 0.215*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
Regime 0.066* 0.055 -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.152*** -0.157*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.252*** 0.251*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036) 
Level of education 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
Urban dweller 0.060 0.059 0.197*** 0.202*** 0.166*** 0.164*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.043) (0.043) (0.039) (0.039) 
Constant -2.459*** -2.424*** -2.725*** -2.696*** -3.035*** -2.992*** 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.134) (0.132) (0.124) (0.123) 
       
Observations 
Random effects  
20,013 
YES 
20,020 
YES 
23,802 
YES 
23,818 
YES 
41,760 
YES 
41,763 
YES 
Number of countries 18 18 20 20 29 29 
 Logit model with standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 
Table 3.4- Coefficient effects for protest participation 
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I find mixed support for corollary hypothesis H1a, which postulates that people who rarely 
go without food or water are more likely to protest compared to those who always go without 
either basic need. The predicted probabilities for each category are presented in table 3.5. In terms 
of access to food, the probability of protest participation is highest among those who report always 
going without food, compared to those who report having poor access to food just once or twice. 
Thus, as far as food access goes, I find that people who face chronic food insecurity are more likely 
to protest than those facing acute food insecurity. When turning water access, the opposite pattern 
emerges: people facing acute water insecurity are more likely to protest compared to those facing 
chronic water insecurity. These results support the idea that when access to basic resources is 
limited, feelings of relative deprivation drive people to the streets. 
 
Table 3.5. – Marginal effects of access to food and water on protest participation (%). 
                          ROUNDS 3-5  
       20052013               
 Food Water 
Never 39.0 39.5 
Once or twice 43.9 46.0 
Several times 44.3 44.0 
Many times 42.4 43.6 
Always 51.6 44.6 
 
These results seem to suggest that citizens place a hierarchical value on a temporary 
disruption to water and food access. In other words, people tend to be more sensitive to short-term 
disruptions to water access than food. Instinctively, clean water ranks highest for two reasons. 
First, lack of water will cause death before lack of food. Second, lack of water can force people—
particularly women—to search for and drink contaminated or dirty water that often leads to 
illnesses such as diarrhea, cholera and typhoid. According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), in 2012 about 284,298 people died from malnutrition and more than double that number 
died from diarrhea in Africa (WHO 2012). The statistics are grimmer when only children under 
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five are considered—malnutrition was responsible for 54,775 infant deaths and diarrhea led to 
three times as many deaths (Ibid). 
Despite the fact that other variables have a powerful role in predicting individuals’ 
motivations to protest, limited access to both basic needs remains significant across all three 
models, suggesting that poor access to water or food are strong predictors of protest particpation 
in sub-Saharan Africa. These results support Sen’s (1976, 1981) expectation that food insecurity 
prevails when there is a decrease in an individual’s entitlement to food. 
Contrary to the assertions of DiPasquale and Glaeser (1996), who argue that unemployment 
is related to high-risk activism, I find evidence in line with Bratton et al. (2005), who find that it 
is employed individuals who more likely to protest. In terms of poor access to food, the odds of a 
person being employed during round 3 are 1.09 and during round 4 are 1.06 times larger than a 
person who was unemployed, holding all variables constant (p<0.01). The same odds are depicted 
in terms of poor access to water for the same survey rounds. However, employment status is not 
statistically significant for either basic need during survey round 5. Therefore, I therefore find 
mixed support for hypothesis H2, which claims that employed people, not the unemployed, should 
be more likely to protest as a result of poor access to water or food. 
The control variables, for the most part, behave as expected. Higher levels of education 
and urban dwellers, mostly young and male, are strongly associated with and statistically 
significant for increases  in the likelihood of protest participation (Resnick & Casele 2011; Dionne 
et al. 2014). The four indicators are consistent with recent African scholarship (e.g., Bratton et al. 
2005). Similarly, two factors related to civic interest show a strong tendency for individuals who 
belong to a community group and are interested in public affairs being likely to protest. The 
directionality of these variables is as expected and statistically sicgnifiant (at p<0.01).  
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Moreover, the findings show some support for the inverted-U hypothesis linking protest 
participation and regime type. Regime is negativelly associated with protest participation through 
models 3 to 6 (survey rounds four and five), though the relationship is not significant in the first 
two models. This indicates that institutional coherence matters for deterring protest participation, 
a finding consistent with the literature (Hegre et al. 2001; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012). Additional 
models that exclude the highest amount of protest occurrence in each survey round confirm the 
robustness of the main findings.33  
 
Conclusion  
Although the cross-sectional data used in this chapter only provides three snapshots in time and is 
admittedly a limitation of this study, the results successfully describe the mindset of the sampled 
population from 2005 to 2013. I close this chapter by revisiting the question that I began with: Do 
people who have inadequate access to water and food display a higher propensity to participate in 
protest, compared to those who have uninterrupted access? The answer is yes. Sub-Saharans 
citizens with poor access to either basic need are more likely to protest.  
The results presented here suggest two main and important findings. First, chronically-food-
and-water insecure people are more likely to protest than those facing acute food insecurity. 
Second, between 2005 and 2009 job holders were more likely to protest than their unemployed 
counterparts. Thus, hinting that it is employed individuals who become concerned about 
impoverishment (or falling back into poverty) who are more prone to protest.  
To conclude, the findings from this chapter suggest that structurally induced food and water 
scarcities facing the region are strong motivators for people to take to the streets in sub-Saharan 
                                                 
33 All robustness models in this monograph are included in the appendix.  
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Africa. Given the evidence presented, it seems important that policy makers take the necessary 
steps to increase accessibility to food and water for all segments of the population. This could 
entail an increase in quality and quantity of infrastructure such as roads, bridges and ports, a 
continuation of robust economic growth in the region that includes a reduction in income 
inequality, and the strengthening of political institutions that can reduce corruption among public 
officials. 
As climate change and rainfall variability begin to have both short- and long-term impacts 
on the availability of crop yields and water basins, the potential for environmentally induced 
scarcity increases. If inadequate distribution of resources is the norm in most sub-Saharan 
countries, how will future climatic shocks further impact the social distribution of resources and 
social cohesion? If governments are already unable to equally distribute renewables among all 
segments of the population when there are enough resources to go around, how will these 
governments react when the availability of food and water declines due to climate change and 
variation? Climate shocks have the potential to worsen the already dysfunctional, structurally 
induced scarcity of food and water by decreasing availability of resources. In other words, climate 
change can provide the coup de grâce to an already fragile distribution system, that in turn, can 
increase the frequency of social unrest. Therefore, in the next chapter, I explore whether climate 
shocks have begun to increase the frequency of social unrest in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of 
declines in crop production.   
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FOUR 
 
CLIMATE VARIABILITY, CROP PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL UNREST  
 
Scientific consensus that the planet is warming has increased the level of interest in the social 
consequences of climate change. Aside from depleting Artic sea ice and rising sea levels, 
temperature and rainfall variability are expected to increase. Dry regions will become drier and 
wet ones wetter. However, the relationships between rainfall and temperature variability and 
various conflict processes are controversial. These are often based on the idea that deviations from 
mean temperature or rainfall averages will lead to a scarcity of basic resources such as water and 
crop yields, particularly in developing countries (World Bank 2007, 2014).  
President Obama (2015) has cautioned that “severe weather events lead to displacement, 
scarcity, stressed populations; all increase likelihood of global conflict” (Hackman (2015).  
Similarly, in 2007 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon suggested that a decrease in rainfall had 
resulted in resource scarcity that sparked resource conflicts between farmers and herders in South 
Sudan—a clash that later escalated into a civil conflict (Ki-Moon 2007). Despite such claims, 
academic consensus on the climate-conflict relationship remains elusive (for a review, see Mildner 
et al. 2011; Gleditsch 2012).  The majority of the literature that explores the climate-conflict nexus 
has narrowly focused on rainfall variability as the principal predictor of political violence, and on 
armed rebellion as the primary outcome from this relationship. Nordås & Gleditsch (2007) have 
urged scholars to reconsider the kind of political violence expected to result from climate change 
and to further disentangle the causal chains between conflict and climate change. This chapter 
undertakes both recommendations.  
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So far I have examined the nexus between poor access to resources and protest participation 
at the micro-level. The empirical results lead me to claim that people who experienced poor access 
to water or food from 2005 to 2013 were more likely to protest, particularly employed individuals. 
While poor access to resources is not new, an environmental-induced drop in basic resources may 
emerge from a warming planet, creating a potential dual-track between structural and supply-
induced scarcities that can further exacerbate food insecurity in many parts of the world, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The FAO estimates that if the aggregate amount of calories from all the food produced 
annually were equally distributed among the total population of the planet, each person would 
obtain 2,750 calories—more than the 2,100 minimum daily energy requirement.34 Nevertheless, 
by the end of 2015, the WFP estimated that 795 million people worldwide did not have enough 
food to live a healthy lifestyle.35 It is clear then, as famously conveyed by Sen (1982), that existing 
structural failures can prevent large segments of the public from having access to enough food. 
 Food production conditions south of the Sahara are dismal. The region does not produce 
enough food to feed its growing population. As a result, most sub-Saharan countries depend on 
large amounts of food imports to fill this gap (Rakotoarisoa et al. 2012). For instance, from 2000 
to 2005 the region imported 43 percent of all its grains (FAO 2008). Moreover, in 2011, increased 
food demand pushed the region’s total agricultural imports from all suppliers to $43 billion—$16 
billion more than India, a country with a much larger population.36  
The IPCC suggests that warmer temperatures and erratic rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa will 
reduce yields for staple cereals such as rice, maize and wheat. Yields in the region are expected to 
                                                 
34 FAO: http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0262e/x0262e05.htm    
35 World Food Program Fact Sheet: http://www.wfp.org/content/hunger-map-2015  
36 Data from UN Comtrade Database. Note: Nigeria, Angola and South Africa accounted for 39 percent of all 
imports, the remaining countries accounted for the other 46 percent of all imports.  
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drop between 515 percent for each degree of warming (Solomon et al. 2011). Examining the 
future effects of climate variability on food production in sub-Saharan Africa, a recent study finds 
evidence of a 15 percent yield decline for rice, a 34 percent decline for wheat and a 10 percent 
decline for maize by 2050 when compared to non-climate change scenarios (Nelson et al. 2009). 
In order to successfully mitigate future scarcity scenarios and their potential social consequences, 
political scientists have begun to examine and debate the potential effects that temperature and 
rainfall anomalies will have on renewable resources. 
Using the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) and data from 38 sub-Saharan 
countries, this chapter examines the relationship between rainfall and temperature deviations, 
cereal yields, and social unrest in sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2012. Of particular interest are 
the potential impacts that deviations from average temperature and rainfall patterns have on cereal 
yields, and their influence on low-intensity social unrest that is short of full-blown civil war. 
 
Climate variability and cereal yields 
Temperature and rainfall variability are known to be extreme in large parts of Africa (Adano & 
Witsenburg 2009). It is well established that human activity linked to fossil-fuel burning has a 
major impact on the global environment (IPCC 2007, 2014; Stern 2008).  Food production is 
heavily dependent upon ecological systems that are now experiencing rapid changes. Sub-Saharan 
Africa has a range of climate risks that can have far-reaching socio-economic and political 
consequences. Even if warming is limited to 2°C, the goal set by the 2015 Paris Agreement, 
substantial risks remain. As warming continues these risks will only worsen.  
Temperature has two extremes that can affect crop yields: cold and heat. Tropical regions, 
like most of sub-Saharan Africa, are expected to experience a shortening of their growing season 
due to longer dry spells. Temperatures above those tolerated by the physiology of crops decrease 
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yields (Jalloh et al. 2013). Yearly temperatures in the region are already above ideal conditions for 
wheat production during the growing season, and maize reductions have also been observed in 
areas above certain temperature thresholds (World Bank 2013). This situation is expected to 
worsen by soil erosion—due to the inability of vegetation to survive harsh conditions. With a 
warming of 0.8 C so far, longer drought trends and land drying have been observed (World Bank 
2012). Figure I shows the juxtaposition between temperature anomalies and cereal yields in 
Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2012. With the exception of 2008,37 there is a visible opposite pattern 
between both indicators: cereal yields decrease during warmer than average years. 
 
Figures I-J: Temperature and precipitation anomalies and cereal yields.    
    
 
Warmer temperatures will also put pressure on water availability across the region. Turning 
back to Zimbabwe, Figure J shows a close pattern between precipitation anomalies and cereal 
yields: years with above average precipitation experience an increase in cereal yields. Low 
precipitation levels are not the sole cause of crop declines. The opposite is also true. The NOAA 
noted that in November 2014, the lack of precipitation in Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe had led to soil deterioration, only to witness a complete reversal of weather anomalies 
                                                 
37In 2008 the country experienced one of its worst food crisis due to a combination of poor weather, inflation, a 
shortage of seeds and fertilizers and a political crisis. 
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a month later. Rainfall brought crippling precipitation surpluses that revived the soil, only to 
destroy it (Di Liberto 2015). By their estimate, “25,000 hectares of cropped land were impacted in 
Malawi, 65,000 hectares were affected in Mozambique, 9,900 hectares of rice fields were flooded 
in Madagascar, and an additional 7,900 hectares of crops were damaged in the region.”38 
The overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan countries have made no significant 
improvements in irrigation technologies (FAO 2002). The irrigated area of sub-Saharan Africa 
makes up only 8 percent of the total cultivated area—two thirds of which is located in Madagascar, 
South Africa and Sudan.39 This is a relatively low number when compared to Asia’s 37 percent 
and 14 percent in Latin America of irrigated crops (Liang 2008). The lack of irrigation systems 
leaves crops to the whims of weather fluctuations. However, some crops are more sensitive to 
rainfall than others. For instance, maize is highly sensitive to water stresses and needs a gross 
rainfall between 500800 mm/season to mature, while sorghum is more tolerant to water shocks 
and only requires 400650 mm/season to mature (Critchley & Siegert 1991). The vulnerability of 
both staple grains is of particular concern given their high nutritional impact in the region. By 
some estimates, “maize accounts for between 30 to 50 percent of low income household 
expenditures in Eastern and Southern Africa” (Idoko et al. 2013: 58).  
 
Climate variability, cereal yields and social unrest  
This chapter focuses on unorganized low-intensity forms of social unrest such as violent events 
and peaceful protests.40 It should not be assumed that these types of conflicts are less significant 
                                                 
38
 Published on Famine Early Warning Systems Network http://www.fews.net  
39
 It is important to note that SSA has the estimated irrigation potential to increase from its current 6 million 
hectares to 42.5 million (Kadigi et al. 2012). 
40 The dependent variable is not the count of food riots per se, but rather the total per country annual count of unrest, 
regardless of the first issue mentioned as the source of the tension/disorder.  
60 
 
than civil wars simply because of their lower number of human casualties and limited damage to 
infrastructure. Indeed, they can be quite disruptive. For instance, in 2016, thousands of rural 
landowners who lost crops after two years of drought protested in northern India to demand relief 
from the federal government. During the process, the protesters damaged the Munak Canal—
which delivers 60 percent of the drinking water to New Delhi. About 10,000 soldiers were 
dispatched to control the protesters. Clashes between soldiers and protesters resulted in at least 15 
deaths and hundreds of injuries.41 Although these events are usually less deadly than armed 
rebellions, they cost lives and can disrupt basic government functions, and can escalate into full-
blown civil wars.  
In 2011, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research found that 35 percent 
of all conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa were over resources: 16 non-violent disputes, 9 violent crises 
and 7 wars.42 Scarcity of renewable resources has been found to increase the likelihood of low-
intensity conflict, whereas non-renewable resources have been associated with large-scale violence 
(DeSoysa 2002). The literature on environmental security has been overwhelmingly focused on 
identifying a direct link between climate conditions and conflict (Barnett & Adger 2007; Raleigh 
& Urdal 2007; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012). Two distinct approaches dominate most of this 
literature. The first approach typically uses rainfall anomalies as a proxy for climate change and a 
second approach uses temperature anomalies. 
 The “rainfall approach” identifies four direct causal mechanisms to explain the climate-
conflict nexus. The first mechanism is a ‘zero-sum’ scenario that deals with scarcity. This link 
proposes that periods of above-average decreases in precipitation increase the probability of 
                                                 
41 For more on the northern India protests see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/22/india-caste-protesters-
accept-offer-to-end-riots-and-water-crisis   
42 HIIK reported a total of 91 conflicts in SSA for 2011. The report is available at: 
http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2011.pdf  
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conflict. The argument contends that social groups will compete for scarce resources imposed by 
climate change (Home-Dixon 1999). Conversely, a second argument suggests that a decrease in 
below-average rainfall is more likely to see a decrease in conflict, given that there is little to fight 
for (Raleigh & Kniveton 2012). This line of thought assumes that relative gains from engaging in 
conflict during drier periods are too low to justify conflict participation. Freshwater scarcity, for 
example, has played an important role in this nexus. One neo-Malthusian argument theorizes that 
water scarcity will increase the probability of so-called “water wars” (Klare 2001). Exploring this 
argument, Tir & Stinnett (2012) find that water scarcity does increase the likelihood of militarized 
conflict, but that institutionalized agreements can mitigate this effect. Similarly, by focusing on 
Central Asia’s Syr Darya water allocation problems, Bernauer & Siegfried (2012) find that 
climate-change induced interstate conflicts over water scarcity are unlikely.  
A third causal mechanism shifts the focus from ‘scarcity’ to abundance. The assumption is 
that abundance of rainfall increases the likelihood of conflict, given that it can prompt rent-seeking 
and recruitment of participants (Hendrix & Salehyan 2012; Buhaug 2010). However, this argument 
assumes a desire to take over the state as the primary goal behind the conflict. Finally, there is a 
scenario where abundance of rainfall can lead to a decrease in the probability of conflict, given 
that individuals and groups are self-sufficient and therefore less likely to take part in conflict. 
Given that sub-Saharan countries remain highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture for both 
personal income and economic growth, with agriculture accounting for more than 50% of GDP 
and up to 90% of employment across much of the continent, the common focus on precipitation 
makes sense (Hendrix & Glaser 2007; Burke et al. 2009). However, most of the growth was due 
to cropland expansion rather than per-acre production increases. According to Chauvin et al. 
(2012:67), “agricultural GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa averaged 2.3 percent per year in the 
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1980s and 3.8 percent per year in the 2000s.” However, focusing solely on rainfall can prove 
shortsighted. Recent studies stress the particular role of temperature in explaining past spatial and 
temporal variation in agricultural yields and economic output in the region (Schlenker & Lobell 
2009). It is also possible that temperature variations could have already played a role in past (and 
can influence future) conflict outbreaks; however, few studies have explicitly considered the role 
of temperature in these cases. 
Thus far, political science research embracing the “temperature approach” has been too 
narrow. Anticipating the social consequences of a warming world is hard, mostly because it is 
unclear whether rising temperatures will systematically increase the likelihood of violent conflict 
(Landis 2014). Even though some research shows temperature variations to be directly associated 
with violent conflict, there is poor understanding of the causal mechanisms for this relationship 
(Hsiang et al. 2013). For instance, Hsiang et al. (2011) find that the probability of new civil 
conflicts arising in tropical latitudes doubles during El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) years, 
relative to La Niña events. Their results led them to claim that ENSO years might have had a role 
in 21 percent of all civil wars since the 1950s, although their results are not generalizable to gradual 
trends in average temperature or particular characteristics of man-made climate change. By their 
own admission, Hsiang et al. (2011:440) claim that “generalizing our results to global climate 
changes other than ENSO will require an understanding of the mechanisms that link conflict to 
climate.”  
In more recent work, Hsiang et al. (2013) find that warmer temperatures increase the 
frequency of intrapersonal violence (e.g., murder, assault) by 4 percent, and intergroup violence 
(e.g., riots, civil war) by 14 percent. The authors’ findings have been strongly criticized, as well as 
their argument that the inclusion of socio-political, economic and demographic covariates are “bad 
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controls” due to their potentially endogenous links between them and weather indicators (Becker 
2013). However, ignoring socio-political and other key factors that are well documented to 
influence conflict reduces “conflict to an immediate and unmediated function of physical, 
biological and physical-geographical signals” (Raleigh et al. 2014: 76).  
The climate-conflict nexus has two important gaps. First, the literature overwhelmingly 
focuses on civil war as the principal outcome for scarcity and abundance scenarios. Second, most 
arguments focus on a direct link between climatic shocks and conflict processes. Such narrow 
focus on a direct relationship fails to investigate clear-cut causal pathways that result from climatic 
conditions (for some exceptions, see Miguel et al. 2004; Koubi et al. 2012; Delvin & Hendrix 
2014). This one-track linkage of the climate-conflict literature on sub-Saharan Africa is mostly 
based on two assumptions. The scarcity argument assumes that, because most sub-Saharan 
countries remain highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture for both personal income and economic 
growth, temperature or precipitation anomalies negatively affect crop yields, which results in 
conflict. However, this assumption has been scarcely scrutinized and is often taken as a fact (see 
Hendrix & Glaser 2007). The second assumption is that poor people—regardless of whether they 
are farmers or not—will take to the streets as a result of crop declines. Both of these assumptions 
and their consequences are vastly under researched.  
For instance, under these two assumptions, Burke et al. (2009) find that warmer years 
increase the likelihood of civil war by 4.5 percent and then cause a 0.9 percent increase in conflict 
incidents the following year. The authors suggest that poor farmers are more likely to participate 
in armed rebellion in warmer years. However, the authors do not include crop production or a 
proxy measurement to support their assumptions. Before arriving to such conclusions, it is 
important to first establish a link for the assumption that either temperature or precipitation 
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variations from the mean are associated with social unrest via crop failure in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Thus, my main hypotheses are: 
H1: The interaction between extreme deviations from average rainfall patterns and cereal 
yields should be associated with an increase in the frequency of social unrest. 
 
H2: The interaction between extreme deviations from average temperature patterns and 
cereal yields should be associated with an increase in the frequency of social unrest. 
 
At present, economic motivations for conflict are well documented in the conflict literature 
(see Blattman & Miguel 2010). Therefore, the second step in the climate-crops-conflict nexus is 
to identify the role that economic motivators play in the strongly agro-dependent African 
economies. Economic triggers that result from low crop yields via climatic shocks have two 
important implications. First, climatic shocks can further strain the distribution of resources from 
governments to large segments of the population. Second, climatic shocks limit the amount of 
auto-consumption and income for farmers and often increase food prices for urban-dwellers.  
In a region where 15 percent of the population was able to leave extreme poverty behind 
over the last decade and about 85 million people are employed by the agriculture sector, climatic 
shocks can generate short-term economic instability that increases the risk of poverty (or falling 
back into poverty) for large segments of the population. Both scenarios have the potential to 
worsen economic grievances among urban and rural populations, increasing their disposition to 
participate in social unrest.  
Research Design 
Due to the highly skewed distribution of events from the Social Conflict in Africa Database 
(SCAD) dataset, I employ a negative binomial model with robust standard errors clustered in 
countries. Table 4.1 provides summary statistics. The robustness of the results is explored by 
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excluding South Africa and Madagascar, given their developed irrigation infrastructure. The 
robustness check does not alter the main findings.  
 
Table 4.1 Summary of main sample statistics 
     Mean  SD  Min  Max          
Dependent variables 
Total events    7.49  15.40  0  240 
Violent events    4.85  12.44  0  219   
Peaceful protests   2.64  4.58  0   39 
 
Environmental factors 
RAIN     0.07  0.98  -2.87  4.67 
RAIN2     0.98  1.58  5.07  21.86 
RAIN*log cereal yields   0.74  9.18  -25.75  45.35 
RAIN2*log cereal yields  9.12  14.97  0.0004  212.08   
TEMP     0.93  0.85  -1.86  3.84 
TEMP2     1.60  2.13  8.97  14.80 
TEMP*log cereal yields   8.62  7.95  -17.22  37.34 
TEMP2*log cereal yields  14.84  19.85  7.46  143.69   
 
Controls     
log GDP per capita(t-1)   22.28  1.30  18.77  26.48  
Polity2     0.45  5.32  -10  9   
Polity22    28.93  23.93  0  100 
log total population (t-1)   15.34  2.77  3.01  18.94   
Civil war occurrence    0.21  0.41  0  1   
Time trend    11.95  6.62  1  23 
 
 
Dependent variables 
Three dependent variables are used for low-intensity conflict: total events, violent events and 
nonviolent events. Social unrest variables are from the SCAD.43 Total events is the sum of violent 
and non-violent events. Violent events are those where the actors initiating the event act to cause 
damage to property or people such as riots, government repression, anti-government violence and 
                                                 
43
 SCAD collects events from the Associated Press and Agence France Presse newswires that contain detailed event 
information such as duration, magnitude, actors and targets. A total of 6, 305 events have been coded for African 
countries with a population of more than one million.  
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both intra- and inter-governmental violence. Nonviolent events are those not intended to cause 
harm to property or people. A lagged dependent variable is also included for all dependent 
variables to account for the possibility of past episodes of unrest influencing future ones. Figure K 
displays the distribution of social unrest in sub-Saharan Africa over time.  
 
Figure K. Social unrest in sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2012. 
 
 
Independent variables: cereal yields and climate shocks 
Cereal yields 
Cereals are the most important source of nutrition in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of purchases and 
auto-consumption (Chauvin et al. 2012). Therefore, to examine disruptions to yearly cereal yields, 
I use a country-level aggregate of total cereal yields intended for human consumption from 
FAOSTAT. The natural logarithm of cereal yields is used to correct for outliers in the data. Unlike 
food price statistics, which are historically more often related to structural conditions such as 
corruption and targeted government interventions (e.g., subsidies), domestic cereal production is 
intrinsically related to rainfall and temperature patterns (Smith 2014; Weinberg & Bakker 2014).  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
S
o
ci
a
l 
 u
n
re
st
 e
v
en
ts
Year
67 
 
 
Climate change proxies  
Both covariates are estimated using 0.5° latitude/longitude gridded data from the Climate Research 
Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia.44 Yearly data for each sub-Saharan country is 
transformed into moving standardized cumulative rainfall and temperature, RAIN and TEMP. This 
is defined as the total precipitation and recorded mean temperature of n years (current year minus 
year n-1 year), minus the moving average of the equivalent period over the previous 30 years. This 
varies from the percentage change in annual rainfall from a single previous year (Hendrix & Glaser 
2007), the Standardized Precipitation Index (Guttman 1999) and specific temperature anomalies 
like ENSO because the base period for the long-term mean and standard deviation is the 30 years 
prior to the year of interest, rather than the total period. This controls for the expectations of 
farmers regarding previous rainfall and temperature patterns that may affect cereal yields (Sovey 
& Green 2011). Undeniably, these variables do not account for the potential cross-border effects 
of rainfall and temperature anomalies in one country on the agricultural conditions of downstream 
countries. However, in the case of rainfall, this is minimal in Africa where irrigation infrastructure 
is lacking and agriculture is almost entirely rain-fed. Finally, precipitation and temperature 
variability do not affect every sub-Saharan region equally. I also include the squared term of both 
variables. Finally, given the main interest of this chapter, an interactive variable is introduced to 
account for the potential effects between both climate proxies and cereal yields on the frequency 
of social unrest.  
 
Control variables 
                                                 
44 The monthly data is added to obtain the total yearly precipitation per country.   
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The inclusion of control variables remains controversial among climate-conflict researchers. One 
side advocates that the inclusion of control variables may be influenced by climatic factors that 
can lead to biased results (Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang et al. 2013). They argue that researchers 
should instead use panel fixed effects and/or time trends to identify the causal impact of 
contemporaneous climatic variations. The other side argues that the exclusion of variables 
previously identified in the literature is necessary to balance the causal weight of climatic factors 
(Buhaug 2010; Theisen 2012; Salehyan & Hendrix 2014). To make the results comparable to the 
existing collective mobilization literature, I include several controls in the analysis, as well as a 
time trend to proxy overall technological advancements in agriculture.   
Several studies find that economic growth decreases the likelihood of political violence 
and peaceful protest (Miguel et al. 2004; Collier & Hoeffler 2004). However, climatic shocks have 
been shown to strongly influence short-term income fluctuations, particularly in agrarian 
economies (Bergholt & Lujala 2012).  This relationship is presently unfolding in Ethiopia. In 2015 
Ethiopia was among the fastest growing economies, but after battling the worst drought in 30 years, 
the IMF has downgraded the country’s projected 2016 GDP growth from 8.1 percent to 4.5 
percent—with recovery expected to 7 percent in 2017 (IMF 2016).45 As government demands to 
shift economic resources to emergency food programs while economy shrinks, these assistance 
programs can be a source of social unrest if implemented correctly and further mislead food 
markets and suppresses local production (Hendrix & Brinkman 2013). Moreover, in times 
temporary of acute food insecurity via climate shocks, abrupt short-term declines in economic 
performance are likely perceived as increased deprivation for a large number of people (Gurr 1968; 
Hendrix et al. 2009). As economic in the face of temporary adverse changes in their economic 
                                                 
45 World Economic Outlook, April 2016. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/index.htm  
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well-being. Therefore, to control for the association between climatic shocks and social unrest vis-
à-vis temporal changes in welfare, I include the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in 2005 US$).  
It is important to acknowledge that not all cases of food scarcity culminate in protests, 
marches or riots. Political institutions play two important roles in the mitigation of social unrest. 
First, governments with strong institutions (e.g., democracies) are more likely to provide broader 
access to food for their citizens, while states with weak institutions may not have such a broad 
reach. Second, strong institutions are able to resolve non-violent events over resource scarcity 
before they escalate by providing alternative conduits for the expression of grievances (Mildner et 
al. 2011). Moreover, sub-Saharan African has been dominated by so-called hybrid regimes since 
the early 1990s. Because the survival of political leaders in these regimes are more likely to depend 
on the support from of a narrow base of supporters, political leaders have a compulsion to appease 
their base.46  
With this in mind, there are two key reasons why hybrid regimes are more likely to 
experience protest when renewable resources decrease. First, most hybrid regimes have 
institutions and elections similar to those in democracies. These institutions allow for citizens’ 
grievances to be voiced while strategically allowing the formation of some opposition groups 
and political parties that can help sustain an illusion of control and progress. This signals to the 
citizenry that dissent is tolerated and in some cases, concessions from the government are not 
far-fetched.  
Second, because the survival of political leaders in personalist regimes is dependent on 
the distribution of benefits and patronage to their support base, political leaders in these regimes 
are more vulnerable to economic and external shocks that reduce the amount of benefits available 
                                                 
46 See Barbara Geddes (1999) for a typology of authoritarian regimes. 
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to distribute (Bates 1981; Geddes 1991, 1999).  Therefore, in times of cereal shortages from 
climatic shocks, political leaders will ration renewable resources in order to shield their support 
base from scarcity and its harmful outcomes. By doing this, political leaders are able to appease 
their support base and avoid challenges to the regime, giving no systematic preference to the rest 
of the population.  
Therefore, in the face of climatic shocks that decrease crop production, political leaders 
will choose to ration in order to strategically distribute the limited resources among their base, 
while systematically neglecting the rest of the population. For this reason, I expect hybrid regimes 
to be associated with an increase in the frequency of social unrest. To capture the capacity of the 
state to distribute resources among the population, I include Polity2 and its squared term to capture 
the potential inverted U-shaped effect of a regime’s ability to tolerate dissent.47  
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are net food importers. Trade data on all agricultural 
import value is introduced to the model. Values from FAOSTAT are expressed in thousand U.S. 
dollars. Agricultural imports can be a double-edged sword. On one hand, the higher the food 
imports, the less susceptible a country will be to crop shortages. On the other, higher food imports 
make countries more susceptible to international food price shocks (Hendrix & Haggard 2012). 
For these reasons, I have no expectation for the directionality of this covariate.   
The occurrence of civil war can obscure the reporting of other forms of collective action, 
and sometimes the conflict itself can be the cause of large demonstrations, as was the case for 
Liberia in 2003 (Hendrix & Salehyan 2012). Furthermore, this variable accounts for the negative 
impacts that an ongoing conflict has on cereal production. Total population increases are 
                                                 
47 Polity2 differs from Polity in the way it treats regime interruptions, replacing observations of (-66, -77, -88) with 
conventional Polity scores. Polity2 subtracts the Polity AUTOC score from the DEMOC score, producing a 21-point 
scale ranging from 10 (strong democracies) to -10 (strong autocracies). 
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considered a strong determinant of social unrest (Urdal 2005; 2014). First, larger populations are 
believed to be more difficult to control and increase the number of potential rebels (Fearon & 
Laitin 2003). Second, neo-Malthusian concerns posit that populous countries will experience a 
quicker degradation and scarcity of natural resources (Renner 1996; Gleditsch 2001).  
 
Results and Discussion  
The results in table 4.2 report the coefficient estimates for the effects of both climatic proxies and 
cereal yields on the frequency of total events in sub-Sahara African from 1990 to 2012. The first 
three models are the most parsimonious in order to examine the climate-crops-unrest nexus. Model 
1 tests the relation between rainfall deviations, cereal yields and social unrest. Contrary to Hendrix 
& Salehyan (2012), the results indicate that neither higher- nor lower-than-average rainfall patterns 
are  associated with the frequency of social unrest in sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the interaction 
term between rainfall deviations and cereal yields is not associated with the frequency of social 
unrest in the region. This suggests that rainfall deviations in either direction have yet to 
substantially affect cereal production in the region. I find no support for hypothesis 1. 
Model 2 independently tests the association between temperature anomalies, cereal yields 
and social unrest. The results show two promising findings. First, they indicate the existence of a 
curvilinear relationship between temperature anomalies and social unrest, all else being equal. The 
covariate TEMP2 is positivelly and statistically significant (at p>0.5), suggestive of warmer-than-
average years being more prone to a higher number of social unrest events. Moreover, the results 
show a statistically significant (at p<0.5) association between the interaction term TEMP2 and 
cereal yields with an increased count of unrest. 
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Table 4.2 (DV-total events) Climate chage, cereal yields and social unrest  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Lagged DV 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
log total cereal yields   0.239 0.264 0.244 
 (0.183) (0.193) (0.198) 
RAIN 0.372  0.269 
 (0.508)  (0.512) 
RAIN2 0.086  0.016 
 (0.318)  (0.291) 
RAIN* log cereal yields -0.035  -0.025 
 (0.054)  (0.054) 
RAIN2* log cereal yields  -0.004  0.003 
 (0.032)  (0.030) 
Total cereal imports (US$1000) 0.186*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
TEMP  -1.903 -2.142 
  (1.380) (1.387) 
TEMP2  1.104** 1.245*** 
  (0.486) (0.469) 
TEMP* log cereal yields   0.194 0.222 
  (0.156) (0.156) 
TEMP2* log cereal yields  -0.114** -0.130** 
  (0.054) (0.053) 
Constant -3.149* -3.308* -3.174* 
 (1.736) (1.821) (1.899) 
    
Observations 915 915 915 
Negative binomial with robust standard errors, clustered by country *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results from model 2 have two important implications. First, they supports the notion 
that above warmer-than-average years have already begun to negatively impact cereal yields in 
sub-Sahara Africa, exacerbating the food insecurity situation in the region. Second, declines in 
cereal yields during warmer years are conductive to a higher frequency of social unrest. As a 
robustness check, model 3 includes both climate change proxies to account for ommited variable 
bias. None of the previous results are altered.  
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       Table 4.3 Temperature anomalies, cereal yields and social unrest 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Total events Violent events Peaceful events 
    
Lagged DV 0.043*** 0.060*** 0.104*** 
 
Food production 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
 
log total cereal yields 0.337 0.391 0.284 
 
Environmental factors 
(0.248) (0.241) (0.302) 
 
TEMP -1.301 -1.178 -1.559 
 (1.449) (2.136) (2.201) 
TEMP2 0.927* 0.695 1.132 
 (0.499) (0.867) (0.753) 
TEMP*log cereal yields 0.126 0.117 0.148 
 (0.158) (0.233) (0.234) 
TEMP2* log cereal yields -0.093* -0.069 -0.115 
 (0.055) (0.094) (0.079) 
Controls    
log GDP per capita(t-1) 0.172* 0.226** 0.134 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.088) 
Total cereal imports (US$1000) 0.075 0.065 0.120 
 (0.080) (0.095) (0.075) 
Polity2 -0.001 0.017 -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) 
Polity22 -0.005** -0.007** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
log total population(t-1) -0.037 -0.046 -0.009 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.020) 
Civil war occurrence 0.090 0.180 0.031 
 (0.130) (0.169) (0.120) 
Time trend 0.021** 0.010 0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) 
Constant -6.102*** -7.966*** -6.586** 
 (2.269) (2.103) (2.792) 
 
Countries 38 38 38 
Observations 846 846 846 
Negative binomial with robust standard errors, clustered by country *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.3 includes the environmental factors previously found to be associated with social 
unrest in the previous table and introduces several socio-political and economic controls. Each 
model examines different categories of social unrest. The results show that, cetis paribus, warmer-
than-average years are associated and statistically significant with the frequency of total events (at 
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p<0.01). This is line with recent literatue suggesting that temperature increases amplify rates of 
human conflict (for a review, see Hsiang et al. 2013). 
The interaction term between TEMP2 and cereal yields is also statistically significant with 
the frequency of total  events (at p<0.1). The interaction term is negative, suggesting that this 
interaction decreases the frequency of social unrest. However,  in non-linear models the sign of 
the coefficient for an interaction term may give a misleading signal about the "direction" of the 
interaction. As recommended by Berry et al. (2010), the CLARIFY software (King et al. 2003) is 
used to evaluate the substantive effects of the interaction term on total events when holding all 
other variables at their mean values. This is achieved by calculating the effects of moving from 
the 5th to 95th percentile on the TEMP2 measure when cereal yields are less than average.  
The predicted probabilities are reported in table 4.4. At the 5th percentile (-2 standard 
deviation), the interaction between TEMP2 and less-than-average cereal yields is associated with 
a 21.8% increase in the probability of experiencing one event of social unrest—whether peaceful 
or violent. Moving to the 95th percentile (+2 standard deviation), the probability of a peaceful or 
violent event occuring declines to 18.7%. Thus, the likelihood of experiencing one episode of 
social unrest event declines when temperature during warmer-than-average years are higest and 
cereal yields fall below average. However, this decrease shifts when two and three social unrest 
events are considered. At the 5th percentile, the probability of a country experiencing two social 
urnrest events is 10.8%. This likelihood rises to 15.9% when TEMP2 is held at the 95 th percentile 
and cereal production is below average. Therefore, higher temperatures during warmer-than-
averages years decrease cereal production, the higher the probability of a country experiencing 
two or three social unrest events. In summation, total events are more sensitive to a drop in cereal 
yields during years reporting above-average temperatures. I find support for hypothesis 2. 
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Table 4.4 Interaction effects between temperature2 and cereal yields on total events 
  
  
 
 
 
All control variables, for the most part, perform as expected. Starting with economic 
prosperity, GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant for total events (at p<0.1) and 
violent events (at p<0.05). In terms of magnitude and strength, the largest effect is reported for 
violent events, although environmental factors are not significant (model 5). The results show that 
countries with higher GDP per capita are more likely to experience a higher frequency of social 
unrest and supports recent research on political participation in sub-Saharan Africa (Barnes & 
Burchard 2012; Dionne et al. 2014). This result may appear insignificant. However, it suggests 
that countries with higher GDP per capita are more sensitive to social unrest via a drop in cereal 
yields during warmer-than-average years.48 
The squared term of Polity2 is negatively associated and statistically significant (at p<0.05) 
for models four and five. The results from model four support the notion that institutional 
incoherence is conductive to a higher count of total and violent events, but not peaceful protests. 
This is consistent with previous literature suggesting that social unrest episodes are more likely to 
occur when there is space for toleration by a polity and when individuals are neither sufficiently 
free to make regular claims, nor so repressed as to prevent them from trying to do so for fear of 
                                                 
48 In a more optimist view, the African Development Bank suggests that Africa now has the fastest-growing middle-
class in the world, and by 2060 the Bank expects the 1 billion Africans to join the middle-class. The report is available 
at: http://www.afdb.org/  
 TEMP2 at 5th percentile TEMP2 at 95th percentile 
Pr (1 event) 21.8% 18.7% 
Pr (2 events) 10.8% 15.9% 
Pr (3 events) 5.9% 14.0% 
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repression (Hegre et al. 20011; Geddes 1999). Surprisingly, the total amount of agricultural 
imports has no discernable effect on the frequency of social unrest. Similarly, more populous 
countries and the occurrence of civil war have no statistical association with the frequency of social 
unrest.  
These results suggest three main findings. First, contrary to recent studies that examine the 
direct nexus between climate change and conflict, I find temperature proxies, rather than rainfall 
ones, to be associated with conflict (Theisen 2012; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012). That is, warmer- 
than-average years are more likely to increase the frequency of social unrest south of the Sahara. 
Second, in line with Lesk et al. (2016), I find that warmer-than-average years decrease cereal 
yields, which in turn increases the frequency of social unrest. This is not surprising, since cereals 
are the most important component in food purchases and auto-consumption for both urban and 
rural populations in the region (Chauvin 2012). Third, contrary to the literature on collective 
action, which suggests that lower levels of GDP per capita increase the likelihood of conflict, I 
find wealthier countries to be more sensitive to the occurrence of social unrest. This supports the 
idea that it is not the poorest of the poor who take to the streets first, but rather those who have 
benefited from recent economic prosperity and fear impoverishment. However, further research 
must explore this causal mechanism. 
 
Conclusion  
While there remains room for debate about the causal mechanisms that are conducive towards a 
variety of conflict processes via climate variability, recently shattered century-long global 
temperature records should urge policy makers and academics to further examine the climate-
crops-conflict nexus. Climate change is a potential security risk for sub-Saharan Africa because of 
its strong dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Indeed, in this chapter, I have shown that from 1990 
77 
 
to 2012, warmer-than-average years have increased the frequency of social unrest via drops in 
cereal yields. While the statistical effects may not be very robust, the exploratory goal of this 
chapter was achieved. As global temperatures continue to increase and with the potential for low-
intensity conflicts to escalate into a full-blown civil wars, further research should be focused on 
the effects that climate-induced scarcity will have on distinct conflict processes. Rather than 
simply dismissing such trends in the literature as “alarmist,” the climate-conflict academic 
literature should place more importance on the interactive effects linking climate change proxies 
and food production failures. It is important to note that an increase in social unrest does not occur 
simply because any given year is too warm or there is too little or too much rain, but rather through 
the interaction between climate anomalies and food production. 
 While the primary hope is that the results presented here will advance the academic 
literature in this area, further disaggregated analysis is needed to better understand this 
relationship. For instance, this research suggests that social unrest occurs in the same year that 
warmer-than-average temperatures are experienced. This raises the following questions: 1) Are 
farmers the main force behind episodes of social unrest during the same year that warmer-than- 
average temperatures decrease crop production? or, 2) Are urban dwellers taking to the streets in 
anticipation of future spikes in food prices during warmer-than-average years?  
To conclude, the findings from this chapter suggest that on top of the all-too-common 
structurally induced food scarcities facing the region, temperature anomalies have begun—and 
will continue to—place further pressure on food security in sub-Saharan Africa. Given the 
evidence presented it seems important that policy makers take the necessary steps to lower the 
region’s agricultural sector’s sensitivity to climate shocks. This could entail better irrigation 
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systems and a mixture of rotating crops and genetically modified seeds in some areas. Further 
disaggregated research is needed to answer these important questions.  
As will be seen in the next chapter, land degradation can be an important resource not only 
affecting food production, but also pastoralist communities who heavily depend on fertile lands to 
feed their livestock. Pastoralists require pastures to feed their livestock and earn income. These 
communities are often neglected by state authorities. This leaves them with little room to vent their 
grievances, which makes violence a potential tool to maximize gains (e.g., grassland) when 
climatic shocks befall them. In summation, the next chapter examines whether land degradation is 
exacerbated by continuous climatic anomalies, that in turn, increase the frequency of communal 
violence. 
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FIVE 
 
CLIMATE VARIABILITY, LAND DEGRADATION AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE  
  
 
Little academic attention has been devoid to study the relationship between peripheral 
communities and climate change.49  Dubbed the “climate change canaries,” these communities are 
often thought destined to be the first casualties of a warmer planet, given their strong dependence 
on changing ecosystems for their livelihoods (Meier et al. 2007: 721). Specifically, modest 
consideration has been given to disentangle the climate-conflict causal mechanisms. To fill this 
void in the literature, this chapter examines the effects of climate change on land degradation, and 
the impact of that degradation, in turn, in communal violence in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In the previous chapter, I examined the theoretical and empirical nexus between supply-
induced scarcity of cereal yields and social unrest via climate shocks. The empirical results led me 
to claim that declines in cereal yields in sub-Saharan Africa can be a path towards social unrest 
during warmer-than-average years. While the previous two chapters of this manuscript have 
focused on social unrest that is directed towards the state, I now turn to inter-group violence where 
state authority is not involved in any direct capacity (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008).  
Communal violence is not new. These types of conflicts generally have four main stimuli: 
rebellion and irredentism—mostly based on ethnicity, criminal activities, religious extremism and 
localized violence between rural communities who brawl over access to resources such as water 
and grazing lands (Hann et al. 2014). Communal violence receives little attention from policy 
makers and scholars of conflict processes. Nonetheless, communal violence poses a threat to the 
security of more than fifty million people in sub-Saharan Africa.50 Given the strong dependence 
                                                 
49 These include pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and farmer communities that are organized along a shared identity.  
50 Working paper available at: http://www.fao.org/ag/AGAInfo/programmes/en/pplpi/docarc/execsumm_wp3.pdff    
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of rural communities on ecological systems, communal conflicts tend to cluster in environments 
associated with a lack of water, under-population, state absence, a lack of infrastructure and basic 
social services, and largely uncontrolled spaces and borders (Blench 2001).  
Academic focus on communal conflict has slowly began to increase as scholars slowly 
shift away from state-centric approaches towards lower levels of spatial desegregation and 
dedicate more attention to analyzing the effects of climate change and variability on various 
conflict processes. This growing literature has identified that wetter years are associated with 
organized armed violence (Buhaug 2010; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012; Salehyan & Hendrix 2014; 
Delvin & Hendrix 2014), while low-intensity conflicts, such as riots, protests, and communal 
conflict, are more likely to occur during drier years (Kahl 2006; Homer-Dixon 2007; Hsiang et al. 
2013). However, these studies postulate that climatic conditions directly and dominantly influence 
the likelihood of violence among people, communities and states (Raleigh et al. 2014). However, 
consensus on these links remain elusive.  
Therefore, in this chapter I examine how the frequency of communal violence increases in 
the presence of climate shocks via land degradation. In order to avoid repetition, the next section 
briefly summarizes the current literature on climate change and conflict along with my theoretical 
argument and hypotheses. The section after that presents data and operationalization measures. 
Finally, the results are presented and findings are discussed.  
 
Previous research  
The majority of climate researchers conclude with high confidence that temperatures will continue 
to increase during the following decades, largely due to anthropogenic activities (IPCC 2014; Cook 
2013). The IPCC envisages that climate change will affect different social and environmental 
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systems as temperature and sea levels continue to rise and erratic rainfall reduces water availability 
in some parts of the world (IPCC 2007, 2014).  
In some areas of sub-Saharan Africa, rainfall patterns are twofold: March, April and May 
are the long rain season, while September, October and November are the short rain period. For 
instance, while the most recent IPCC report suggests an overall increase in rainfall for eastern 
Africa, recent academic research finds mixed results. Tierney et al. (2015) find an “overall drying 
of the region,” particularly during the long rain season. However, when looking exclusively at the 
short rainfall season, Schreck and Semmazzi (2004) find an increase in rainfall unfolding in the 
north while decreasing amounts are recorded in the southern region. 
While rainfall can bring much needed relief to pastoralists and farmers alike, too much rain 
and longer dry spells can also cause or exacerbate land degradation. Land degradation is the 
temporary or permanent decrease of the productive capacity of soil.51 The Global Assessment of 
Soil Degradation (GLASOD) provides two major natural hazards for land degradation: water and 
wind. Water contributes to land degradation when rainfall intensity is too high or too low. On one 
hand, too little rain combined with higher temperatures speeds the loss of organic matter in the 
soil. On the other, excessive rain can cause floods that displace topsoil, remove a large amount of 
nutrients and reduce water-holding capacity, all of which can create a long-term problems for land 
productivity.52 Similarly, wind speeds can displace topsoil and selectively remove fine particles, 
particularly in arid and semi-arid climates (FAO 1993). High levels of land degradation decrease 
                                                 
51 “Soil is a living material with microbes that recycle organic material, which underpins the cycle of 
life on earth, and also engineer the soil on a tiny level to make it more resilient and better at holding 
onto water.  Microbes need carbon for food, but carbon is being lost from the soil in a number of ways. 
Simply put, we take too much from the soil and don’t put enough back.”  
Interview from the World Economic Forum available at: http://world.time.com/2012/12/14/what-if-the-worlds-soil-
runs-out/  
52 Topsoil is the first eight inches of soil, with the highest concentration of nutrients and microorganisms that allows 
plants to grow.  
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the productive amount of soil available for grazing land to feed livestock. Thus, land degradation 
Africa will worsen as global temperatures increase and rainfall becomes more erratic.53 
 
Climate shocks and communal conflict 
Pastoral groups face various challenges to their livelihoods: impoverishment, political 
marginalization, shrinkage of grazing land due to the expansion of agriculture, land grabs and 
zoned wildlife parks, as well as armed conflict. To make matters worse, temperature and rainfall 
anomalies are expected to further “shorten the resource pie” among pastoral groups, which often 
contributes to frictions between groups and their neighboring communities (Fratkin 1997; Sharamo 
2014). Anecdotal events from South Omo, Ethiopia, provide prima facie evidence for the claims 
of communal violence occurring as a result of supply-induced scarcity of a basic resource: land. 
While the livelihoods of farming communities in South Omo revolve around the Omro River, 
pastoralist groups are always in pursuit of new grazing lands. In recent years, however, driven by 
a reduction in grazing land during prolonged dry years, pastoralist communities have begun to 
emerge near the Omo River, increasing episodes of violence between pastoralist and farmer 
communities. For instance, pastoralists often shoot farmers who are caught spraying pesticides on 
crops—considered livestock food by pastoralists. Similarly, farmers frequently retaliate against 
pastoralists whose livestock damage their crops (Onyima and Iwuoha 2015). 
At the heart of the debate over the role of climate change is whether rainfall and 
temperature variability will lead to scarcity or abundance of basic resources such as food and water. 
However, recent evidence of the direct climate-communal conflict nexus is mixed at best. A 
recently conducted ethnographic assessment in Eastern Africa illustrates how competition over 
                                                 
53 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification: http://www.unccd.int/en/regional-
access/Africa/Pages/alltext.aspx  
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water and land are the most frequent causes of communal conflicts during wetter-and drier-than-
average seasons (Michael et al. 2005). A proposed causal chain posits that during above-average 
rainfall years (Raleigh and Kniveton 2012) or years following wetter years (Theisen 2012), 
pastoralists communities increase the mobility of their livestock to take advantage of robust 
grazing lands and water deposits, which often lead to conflicts over the abundance of grassland 
and water (Meier et al. 2007).  As Turner (2004: 877) explains, these ‘‘conflicts are less likely to 
be ‘in-the-moment’ struggles over a particular resource patch and more likely to resemble strategic 
contests to maintain resource access over the longer term.’’ Similarly, Adano and Witsenburg 
(2009: 520) find that “twice as many people are killed in wet years than in drought years given 
high grass and dense bush cover which makes it easier to track and ambush” other communities. 
This direct relationship suggests that when wetter seasons bring a limited amount of 
pasture, combined with the uncertainty of rainfall from one year to the next, pastoralist 
communities seek to strategically maximize a way to get fatter livestock that will increase their 
economic impute—a process that requires time and discourages sharing access to renewables with 
others.  
On the scarcity side of the argument, Fjelde & Uexkull (2012) and Mkutu (2008) find 
negative rainfall deviations to be associated with a stronger likelihood of communal conflict in 
sub-Saharan Africa. That is not to say that pastoralists fight over dry patches of land. In fact, 
because they often inhabit drylands where resources are normally dispersed and dependent on 
erratic climatic conditions, pastoralists have learned to recognize regions where rainfall is more 
frequent (Nori et al. 2005). However, during extended dry seasons, scarcity of resources forces 
pastoralists to migrate closer to waterlogged areas in order to access feed and water, making 
farmlands and water deposits common settings for violent clashes (Onyima and Iwuoha 2015).  
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Nonetheless, empirical results from large-N studies examining a relationship between 
precipitation variability and communal conflict are sparse and inconclusive. As with the conflict 
literature exploring climate shocks and episodes of violence towards the state, the research on non-
state actor violence assumes that climate shocks alone can result in violent episodes. However, 
climate shocks may be a necessary but insufficient condition for conflict to occur. Stating that 
conflict occurs solely due to climate anomalies only implies that scarcity or abundance are the 
consequences of climatic shocks. However, there is little research that directly tests this causal 
chain.  
 
Climate variability, land degradation and communal violence 
Figure L shows the theoretical argument proposed in this chapter. Temperature and precipitation 
anomalies are arguably the most important natural hazards for worsening land degradation and 
desertification. The World Meteorological Organization of the United Nations claims that sub-
Saharan Africa is particularly sensitive to land degradation as a result of climate shocks, the 
region’s poor vegetation and high amounts of suspended sediments .54 In fact, the Global Footprint 
Network estimates that in 2011, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda had only 0.1, 0.2, 
0.2, 0.6 and 0.1 global hectares per capita of grazing land left, respectively.55 The already low 
availability of grazing land in some areas and further deterioration brought on by erratic 
precipitation and longer dry spells suggests a very small “resource pie” to be distributed among 
rural communities.  
                                                 
54 World Meteorological Organization report is available at: https://www.wmo.int  
55 “Because each unit of space harbors a different portion of the global regenerative capacity, each unit is counted 
proportionally to its global bio-capacity share. For this reason, hectares are adjusted proportionally to their 
productivity and are expressed in global hectares. A global hectare is a biologically productive hectare with world 
average productivity (The Global Footprint Network 2011). For more information visit: www.footprintnetwork.org.  
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Figure L. Climate shocks, land degradation and communal violence 
 
As land degradation further decreases the amount of pasture land available, tensions 
between rural communities are likely to increase. A study of 200 pastoralists in Mandera, Kenya, 
found that after the 2006 drought, pastoralists lost 87 percent of all cattle, camel and sheep 
(Christian Aid, 2006). These communities mostly derive their income from the sale of animal 
products (e.g., milk, meat and hides), followed by wage labor, remittances and humanitarian aid 
(Halderman 2004; Ammann 2005). Consequently, the income of pastoralist communities is 
strongly and directly tied to livestock—whose productivity depends on grazing lands and water. 
Figure M shows the livestock agglomeration for sub-Saharan Africa.    
Over the last 25 years, Africa has seen a decline in poverty rates.56 This increase in socio-
economic status has simultaneously increased the demand for meat consumption in the region. 
Overall, per capita consumption of meat in sub-Saharan Africa has steadily increased since the 
1990s. In 1994, per capita consumption stood at 9.3 kg compared to 11 kg in 2015.57 During the 
same time period, meat consumption in the Middle East and North Africa—two major (formal and 
informal) livestock importers or meat from pastoralist communities rose from 19.5 kg to 28.6 kg.  
         
  
 
 
                                                 
56 Income groups by income: the poor live on $2.00 or less per day, low-income on $2.01$10.01, middle-income 
on $10.0120.00, upper-middle income on $20.01$50.00, and high income on more than $50. Figures based on 
2011 purchasing power parity in 2011 prices. 
57 Kg per capita in carcass weight equivalent. More information at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4252e/y4252e05b.htm  
Climate shocks land degradation Communal conflict
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Figure M. Total livestock population (TLU 2005)58 
 
                      Source: International Food Policy Research Institute59 
 
Regional meat consumption growth, in theory, should increase the income of pastoralist 
communities through a rise in livestock trade. For instance, in a livestock market in Nairobi, a goat 
or sheep can be sold for about $31$37, a cow for $250$312 and a camel for $625$750.60 
Pastoralists’ expectations of higher incomes, signaled by an increase in livestock exports, should 
simultaneously increase with meat consumption. However, despite such gains, pastoralist 
communities remain one of the poorest sub-groups in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank (2014) 
estimates that among pastoralist communities in Africa,  “the incidence of extreme poverty ranges 
from 25 to 55 percent”.61 Based on this, I argue that if the capabilities to increase their income 
decline as a result of climate shocks, economic grievances can trigger violence towards those 
perceived to be preventing a maximization of capabilities.  
                                                 
58 Tropical Livestock Units are livestock numbers converted to a common unit (in 2005). Conversion factors: cattle 
= 0.7, sheep = 0.1, goats = 0.1, pigs = 0.2, chickens = 0.01. For more information, visit: 
http://harvestchoice.org/node/4788.  
59Harvest Choice, 2011. "Total livestock population (TLU) (2005)." International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, DC., and University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN. Available online at 
http://harvestchoice.org/node/4788  
60 IRIN News: http://www.irinnews.org/report/90678/horn-africa-livestock-trade-booms-borderlands   
61World Bank Boosts Support for Pastoralists in Horn of Africa. Press release available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/18/world-bank-pastoralists-horn-africa  
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In summation, an increase or decrease in the economic capabilities of pastoralists is 
contingent upon healthy and fat livestock, which depend in turn on grassland and water from 
rainfall. However, grasslands depend on fertile soil provided by rainfall. Thus, I examine whether 
temperature and rainfall anomalies exacerbate land degradation and reduce grazing land available 
for pastoralists, thereby increasing the likelihood of communal violence due to fears of economic 
loss.  
 
Six hypotheses are drawn to test the offered theoretical approach:  
Land degradation 
H1 Land degradation should be positively associated to the frequency of communal violence. 
 
Precipitation 
 
H2 Precipitation deviations from average rainfall patterns should increase the frequency of 
communal violence. 
 
H3 The interaction of extreme deviations from average rainfall patterns and land degradation 
should be associated with an increase in the frequency of communal violence. 
 
Temperature 
 
H4 Above-average temperature years should increase the frequency of communal violence. 
 
H5 The interaction between above-average temperature years and land degradation should be 
associated with an increase in the frequency of communal violence. 
 
Research design  
 
Due to the highly skewed distribution of events on the dependent variable, I employ a negative 
binomial model with robust standard errors clustered in countries. The robustness of the results is 
explored using an alternate measurement of rainfall anomalies. The precipitation data is from 
Hendrix and Salehyan (2012), who use the Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP), a 
data set that also uses monthly rainfall estimates that are aggregated at the country level. Their 
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data measure the annual standardized rainfall deviation for the 19792008 period. The robustness 
check did not alter my main findings. Table 5.1 provides summary statistics. 
 
Table 5.1. Summary of main sample statistics 
     Mean  SD  Min  Max          
Dependent variables 
Communal violence   0.29  1.00  0   9 
 
Environmental factors 
Land degradation    0.29  0.26  0  1  
RAIN(t-5)    0.07  0.98  -2.87  4.67   
RAIN2(t-5)     0.98  1.58  5.07  21.86 
Land deg* RAIN(t-5)   0.02  0.38  -2.29  2.27 
Land deg* RAIN2(t-5)   0.28  0.59  0  5.90 
TEMP(t-5)    0.93  0.85  -1.86  3.84 
TEMP2(t-5)    1.60  2.13  8.97  14.80 
Land deg* TEMP(t-5)   0.29  0.44  -0.57  3.64 
Land deg* TEMP2(t-5)   0.50  1.08  0  13.29 
 
Controls     
log GDP per capita(t-1)   22.28  1.30  18.77  26.48   
Ethnic exclusion   0.56  0.49  0  1 
log total population (t-1)   15.34  2.77  3.01  18.94   
Civil war occurrence    0.21  0.41  0  1   
Time trend    11.95  6.62  1  23 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
To operationalize communal violence, I draw from the non-state conflict dataset from Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP). A non-state conflict is defined “as the use of armed force between 
two armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a year” (Sundberg et al. 2012). The dependent variable only includes groups that 
share a common identification along ethnic lines, clan, religious, national or tribal lines. 
 
Independent variables: land degradation and climate shocks 
 
Land degradation 
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To examine the influence of land degradation, I use Hendrix and Glaser’s (2007) per-country 
percentage of total degraded land. Unfortunately, these values are static within countries and are 
an admitted limitation of this study. It should be noted that this does in no way implies that the 
data are necessarily outdated, as most soil properties are in fact quite stable over time, and 
significantly measureable over a time span of 2030 years. For a more detailed discussion of 
variable construction, see the FAOs World Soil Resources Report (2000).62  
 
Climate shocks 
 
The operationalization of both covariates is performed under the same conditions stipulated in the 
previous chapter—using 0.5° latitude/longitude gridded data from the University of East Anglia 
Climate Research Unit.63 The yearly data for sub-Saharan countries is transformed into a moving 
standardized cumulative rainfall, RAIN and the moving standardized temperature yearly average, 
TEMP. The squared terms of both variables are included to account for a curvilinear relationship. 
To examine the theoretical argument that an interactive effect between climate anomalies and land 
degradation increases communal conflicts, interaction terms between the climate proxies and land 
degradation are introduced into the analysis. Finally, to account for the slow-moving process of 
land degradation via climate shocks, all climate variables are lagged by five years. 
 
Control variables 
 
Pastoralist communities are among the poorest in Africa, as well as the least resilient to climatic 
anomalies. Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2008) suggest that during periods of environmental hardship, 
economic adversity among vulnerable groups is often exacerbated. Given the primary emphasis 
placed on the temporal changes in the welfare of pastoralist communities, I use GDP per capita (in 
                                                 
62 World Soil Resources Report available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/agl/agll/docs/wsr.pdf  
63 The monthly data is added to obtain the total yearly precipitation per country.   
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2005 US$) to test the proposition that economic grievances are a function of the level of income 
levels (Blattman & Miguel 2010). 
Kahl (2006) and Homer-Dixon (1999) suggest that weak institutions limit the ability of 
societies to adapt to environmental scarcity and to properly deal with violent conflict. However, 
pastoralist communities are often excluded from the political arena. Three consequences arise from 
this exclusion. First, political exclusion of ethno-political groups has been found to be strongly 
associated with participation in organized violence (Cederman at al. 2010, Theisen et al. 2010). 
Second, political exclusion results in a strong reliance on ethno-linguistic alliances when 
organizing for collective action around socio-political and economic grievances (Scarritt & 
Mozaffar 1999). Finally, ethno-political groups that are not represented in the political arena share 
grievances that motivate participation in violence. Inter-group violence is a way to mediate access 
to resources critical to sustain livelihood in a space of minimal governments (see also Hagmann & 
Mulugeta, 2008; Cederman et al. 2010). Thus, to control for ethnic exclusion of certain groups 
from the political process, I turn to the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set. The data set 
identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups worldwide since 1945 and provides annual data on 
the group’s access to executive power (Cederman et al. 2010).  Ethnic exclusion is coded 0 for 
non-excluded groups and 1 if otherwise. 
Collier et al. (2003) claim that the spatial and temporal occurrence of conflict can lead to 
repeating cycles of political violence. In order to avoid the inter-dependencies that arise from the 
so-called “conflict trap,” I control for the occurrence of civil war. Finally, I control for the neo-
Malthusian premise that populous countries will experience stronger degradation and scarcity of 
natural resources (Renner 1996; Gleditsch 2001).  
 
 
91 
 
Results and Discussion  
 
The results in table 5.2 report the coefficient estimates for a negative binomial regression model, 
and report robust standard errors clustered in countries. A glance at all three models suggests that, 
cetis paribus, higher levels of land degradation are positively and statistically significant (at 
p<0.01) with a higher frequency of communal violence. Therefore, I find support for hypothesis 
1. That is to say, countries with a higher percentage of total degraded land are more likely to 
experience a higher incidence of communal violence. 
Model 1 presents the coefficient estimates solely using precipitation proxies. The results 
from the first model do not lend support to hypothesis 2, which proposes that precipitation 
anomalies (on either direction) during the previous 5 years increase the frequency of communal 
violence. These findings are contrary to recent research that finds a direct and statistically 
significant relationship between precipitation anomalies and communal violence (Mkutu 2008; 
Fjelde & Uexkull 2012). However, I find support for hypothesis 3. That is, the interaction between 
RAIN at year t-5 and land degradation to be associated and statistically significant (at p<0.05) with 
the frequency of communal violence. In line with my theoretical argument, a strain of five 
consecutive drier-than-average years significantly increase the frequency of communal violence 
via land degradation. This suggests that consecutively drier years have a deteriorating effect on 
soil, reducing availiable pastures for pastoral communities, leading to conflict over scarce 
resources. 
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Table 5.2 Coefficient effects for climate change & land degradation on communal violence    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Lagged DV 0.483*** 0.457*** 0.476*** 
 (0.141) (0.136) (0.127) 
Land degradation 2.483*** 2.345*** 2.480*** 
 (0.775) (0.829) (0.752) 
RAIN(t-5) 0.0751  0.128 
 (0.201)  (0.196) 
RAIN2(t-5) -0.0841  -0.092 
 (0.105)  (0.088) 
Land deg*RAIN(t-5) -0.707**  -0.732** 
 (0.347)  (0.315) 
Land deg*RAIN2(t-5) -0.153  -0.154 
 (0.196)  (0.178) 
TEMP(t-5)  0.622 0.661 
  (0.417) (0.422) 
TEMP2(t-5)  -0.136 -0.144 
  (0.185) (0.182) 
Land deg*TEMP(t-5)  -0.334 -0.430 
  (0.824) (0.770) 
Land deg*TEMP2(t-5)  0.160 0.178 
 
Controls 
 
log GDP per capita(t-1) 
 
 
0.767*** 
 
 
0.750*** 
 
 
0.772*** 
 (0.159) (0.162) (0.159) 
log total population(t-1) -0.062 -0.055 -0.063 
 (0.069) (0.063) (0.062) 
Civil war occurrence 1.567*** 1.467*** 1.495*** 
 (0.358) (0.370) (0.368) 
Ethnic exclusion -0.145 -0.090 -0.082 
 (0.463) (0.459) (0.458) 
Time trend -0.037** -0.044*** -0.045*** 
 
 
Observations 
Countries 
(0.016) 
 
850 
38 
(0.016) 
 
850 
38 
(0.016) 
 
850 
38 
Negative binomial with robust standard errors clustered in countries *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Model 2 presents the coefficient estimates using only temperature measurements to account 
for potential loss of organic matter in soil from temperature increases.64  The results indicate no 
support for hypotheses 3 and 4. These results indicate that consecutive years with above-average 
                                                 
64 WMO: http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/agm/publications/documents/wmo_cc_desertif_foldout_en.pdf  
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temperatures have not (yet) increased the incidence of communal violence. The interaction 
between TEMP2 at t-5 years and land degradation is also not associated with communal violence. 
As a robustness check, model 3 includes the five-year lag of  temperature and precipitation 
anomalies, plus their interaction terms. The results in model 3 do not alter the results found in the 
previous two models. For substantive results tracing the interaction of land degradation and the 
five-year lag of RAIN, I turn to CLARIFY software (King et al. 2003) using the results from model 
3 while holding all other variables to their mean value. The results are displayed in table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Interaction effects between RAIN(t-5) and land degradation  
on communal violence65 
       
  
-3 SD 
 
-2 SD 
 
 -1 SD 
 
 +1 SD 
 
  
+2 SD 
  
+3 SD 
Pr(1) 10.8% 7.2% 6.0% 5.6% 3.5% 2.6% 
Pr(2) 1.8% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.09% 
 
A one standard deviation decrease from the mean interaction between RAIN and land 
degradation increases the probability of experiencing one communal violence event by 6.0%, 
while a two standard deviation decrease from the mean increases the probability of one communal 
violence event by 7.2%. A three standard deviation decrease from the mean interaction between 
RAIN and land degradation increases the probability of one communal violence event by 10.8%. 
This supports the argument that drier consecutive years of negative precipitation anomalies 
intensifies land degradation, placing additional strains on the availability of pasture lands and 
                                                 
65Note: -3 SD held at 1th percentile, -2 SD at 10th percentile; -1 SD at 30th percentile; +1 SD at 70th percentile and 
+2SD at 95th percentile, and +3 SD at 99 percentiles.  
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leading groups to compete for scarce resources (Homer-Dixon 1999; Kahl 2006; Fjelde & Uexkull 
2012).  
Turning to the control variables, the directionality of per capita GDP is positive and 
statistically significant (at p<0.01) across all models. I find support for hypothesis 5. This finding 
is in opposition to Raleigh and Kniveton (2012), who find that lower levels of per capita GDP are 
associated with the onset of communal violence. This finding is in line with the previous chapter, 
reinforcing the idea that as the region’s economic growth continues to lifts people out of poverty, 
climatic shocks increase economic grievances, in this case, among pastoralist communities who 
fear falling (or falling back) into poverty. Neither ethnic exclusion nor are more populous countries 
associated with the frequency of communal violence across models. The occurrence of an armed 
conflict is positively associated and statistically significant with a higher incidence of communal 
violence in the region. This is in line with previous research suggesting that during armed conflicts, 
pastolarist communities become militarized, increasing the severity of resource conflicts among 
pastoralist communities (Gebre 2001; Kassa 2001; Abdulahi 2005). 
 
Conclusion  
 
In contrast to recent research on communal violence and climate shocks (Meier et al. 2007; Raleigh 
and Kniveton 2012) I find that drier, not wetter years, increase the likelihood of communal 
violence via land degradation. This research exposes two central findings. First, rather than assume 
that people react violently to changes in weather patterns, this research provides a conducive causal 
mechanism towards communal violence that advances the climate-conflict nexus. Second, it 
provides robust evidence that the interaction between consecutive drier than average years and 
higher levels of land degradation increases the frequency of communal violence in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
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It is important to note that even when these conditions are met, individuals must choose to 
act violently. In most cases individuals and entire communities chose to adapt or seek relief from 
national and international agencies. For instance, between 2015 and 2016 Ethiopia faced its worst 
drought in 50 years that left millions in need of aid. Ethiopia has the largest livestock population 
in Africa and one of the highest percentages of pastoralist communities in the region (FAO 2015a). 
In a FAO meeting in the country, one pastoralists recounts that before the drought he owned “500 
sheep and goats and 60 cattle, but now has just 13 sheep and goats and 4 cattle ...”66 While many 
pastoralist communities in the country suffered a similar fate, the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Data Project (ACLED) has not recorded a single incidence of communal violence in the 
country since the beginning of the drought.67 While this is simply anecdotal evidence from a single 
country, researchers of conflict processes ought to consider that climate shocks and their impacts 
on various resources can also incite people and communities to cooperate rather than fight with 
one another. To further examine this, more attention should be devoted to resource-conflicts during 
El Niño years that increases the forecast probability of above-average drought by 20 percent in 
some parts of the region, particularly in eastern Africa (WMO 2005).  
  Policy makers ought to expand the reach of legal and political government administrative 
instruments, empower local institutions, and increase transparency between communal groups in 
order to better mitigate potential disputes and resolve conflicts. Failure to do so can have two 
principal consequences. First, as land degradation increases as a result of climatic shocks, 
individuals will seek alternative ways to improve their livelihoods. This can result in an increase 
participation by peripheral communities in criminal networks, including drug smuggling, 
kidnapping and armed groups in North Africa and the Middle East. Second, forced displacements 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 ACLED: http://www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2016/  
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of large segments of people will grow as climate- and human-induced pressures increase demands 
on ecological systems. The International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) estimates that 
in 2014, 17.5 million people around the world were internally displaced by weather-related 
disasters. In 2013 alone, “floods in sub-Saharan Africa triggered five of the 10 largest 
displacements” in recent history (IDMC 2014:8). And, as previously theorized (Reuveny 2007) 
prolonged displacement adds to grievances and trauma, and can spark conflicts. Therefore, while 
for now consensus alludes the climate-conflict research, the quest for a better understanding of this 
complex relationship should not be abandoned. 
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SIX 
 
A GREAT BALANCING ACT 
 
In 100 CE, Roman poet Juvenal recognized that by providing panem et circenses, Roman 
politicians were able to garner public support and prevent the populace from expressing discontent. 
Juvenal was among the first to recognize the important link between food security and a peaceful 
citizenry. Is this assertion still true today? This dissertation sought to answer two important 
questions: does poor access to water and food motivate people to protest? Have climate shocks 
already began to negatively impact crop yields and exacerbated land degradation, that in turn, have 
increased the likelihood of socio-political unrest and communal violence? By exploring these 
questions, this research has sought to contribute to the growing literature on climate change and 
conflict processes. The findings presented in chapters three through five have policy and 
theoretical implications which I discuss below.  
Under the assumption that climate shocks can result in a scarcity or abundance of basic 
resources, the climate-conflict literature has been dominated by the notion that violence is more 
likely when climate shocks occur. Yet, there are two important gaps in this literature. First, the 
current literature has been devoted of quantitative analysis that examines the interactive effect 
between climate shocks and basic resources have on various conflict processes (with the exception 
of Hendrix & Glaser 2007). Second, there is a tendency among researchers to presume that people 
will always choose to react violently instead of choosing to positively cope. In fact, some argue 
that cooperation and aid is often the prevailing response during climate shocks (Raleigh et al. 
2014). This research seeks to clarify this current debate.  
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The micro-causalities between poor access to renewables and protests 
 
To understand how climate change and variability can open a further exacerbate the challenge of 
feeding a growing population, one must first examine the micro-causalities between protest 
participation and access to basic resources such as water and food. Chapter 3 captures a ‘snapshot’ 
in time of these micro-causalities by using Afrobarometer data from three different survey rounds 
collected between 20052013.  Through the chapter, I argue that people who reported going 
without enough water or food would be more likely to protest, when compared to those who 
reported otherwise. The results show that, in fact, people who go without enough water or food 
have a higher probability to protest. The results also indicate that the more often people go without 
access to either basic resource, the higher their likelihood of protesting. The results also suggest 
that contrary to the literature on collective mobilization, employed individuals are more likely to 
protest when compared to unemployed individuals. This suggest that those employed have more 
to lose by not protesting as they risk impoverishment when access to basic resources is limited. 
As I noted in the literature, the scholarship on food security has been static since the 1980s. 
The idea of resource scarcity is not new. In his 1968 book, The Population Bomb, biologist Paul 
Ehrlich renovated the Thomas Malthus projections, which argue that overpopulation would 
outpace the production of food. An economist, Julian Simon, was convinced that Mr. Ehrlich’s 
thesis was flawed. He argued that humans are like no other species in the world given that we have 
an economy and markets. According to his counterargument, if overpopulation led to the demand 
for more resources by increasing their prices, then this price increase would serve as a motivator 
to find more or alternative ways to produce more of that resource. So, in 1980, both men placed a 
bet. Ten years later Mr. Ehrlich lost the bet after his projections failed to materialize.  
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While Mr. Ehrlich’s thesis earned him epithets such as “doomster” and “alarmist” from his 
critiques, his work gained many supporters and inspired others to follow this line of research 
(Meadowns et al. 1972; Jackson & Webster 2016). Among those to carry out this line of research 
was economist Amartya Sen. In his seminal work on famines, Sen (1981) points out that 
production shortfalls do not automatically lead to consumption deficits, rather, he argued, 
consumption deficits occur when political institutions fail to accurately distribute resources. While 
the contribution by Sen is not directly disputed in this pages, we now know that production 
shortfalls need to be reincorporated into the research agenda as a result of climate change. This is 
not to say that distribution problems should be ignored, but it is essential to contemplate that 
climate change will very likely provide the coup de grâce to an already fragile distribution system 
while at the same time reduce food production. To makes matters worse, given the expected 
population growth, world food production needs to increase by 69% to feed 9.6 billion people by 
2050. Climate change is expected to complicate this production challenge. 
Understandably, data on climate change was scarce and our understanding of the potential 
effects of climate shocks on basic resources remained poor at the time of the bet between Simon 
and Ehrlich, and we were just understanding the phenomena by the time Sen’s research was 
published. Since then, much has changed. Good quality data is widely available and the 
understanding of some of the overall impacts of climate change are well documented, including 
the its potential impacts on social cohesion (IPCC 2001, 2007, 2014). However, the causal links 
between climate change and conflict processes remains unclear.  
 
Climate variability, food production and social unrest 
In chapter 4, I examine the interaction effects between climate change and cereal yields, and the 
impact of that interaction, in turn, has on the frequency of social unrest in sub-Saharan Africa. 
100 
 
Cereals are the main food source purchased and auto-consumed by most households in the region 
(Chauvin 2012). Although some cereals are more susceptible to higher temperatures and dry spells 
than others, extreme temperature and precipitation variations can damage plant growth, thus 
weakening plant development that results in yield losses (Bita & Gerats 2013). I find that the 
interaction between cereal yields and above average temperature years increase the frequency of 
social unrest, particularly peaceful protests. This indicates that warmer-than-average temperatures 
have already begun to negatively impact social cohesion when cereal yields decline.  
Previous literature denotes a direct nexus between climate variability and conflict 
(Ragnhild & Gleditsch 2007; Raleigh & Kniveton 2012; Salehyan & Hendrix 2014). However, 
this literature is based on the assumption that climate variability (mostly rainfall) results in 
resource abundance or scarcity. Indirectly, this literature suggests that people will become violent 
when too many or too little resources exists. Yet, not all basic resources affect population sub-
groups equally. For instance, too much rain in semi-arid areas where crop production is absent will 
have no direct impact on urban dwellers. However, in these regions too much rain can increase 
pastures, potentially sparking abundance conflicts among pastoralists who seek to maximize their 
income by fattening their livestock. Thus, different regions and populations have different causal 
mechanisms that can lead to periods of conflict. As the increasing threat of climate change 
continues to impact agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa, yield losses will continue to 
threaten future regional food security and social cohesion. 
The role of political institutions is consistent with previous literature on collective 
mobilization and food security. On one hand, countries with weaker political institutions are 
associated with a higher incidence of protest (Hendrix & Haggard 2012; Weezek 2013). Stronger 
political institutions are more accessible (open regimes) are more likely to mitigate and respond 
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to constituent grievances; however, when these mechanisms fail protests, riots, and 
demonstrations serve as counteractive responses. Autocratic regimes with weak political 
institutions (closed regimes) tend to be highly repressive and usually prevent their citizens from 
developing the organizational means to express their grievances are also less inclined to tolerate 
protest. Such repression deters popular mobilization and represses them if they occur (Goodwin 
2001). However, Africa is the continent with more “anocracies” (hybrid regimes). These regimes 
are characterized by not being either democratic nor autocratic, but rather somewhere in the 
middle with political elements from both regime types (Weezel 2013). Thus, anocracies limit 
political competition and civil liberties but at the same time provide space for contestation and 
opportunity for individuals to make their claims publically, that is, protesting.  
On the other hand, democratic regimes (e.g., strong democratic institutions) are more 
efficient when it comes to providing a broader access to basic resources such as water and food 
for their citizens. However, authoritarian regimes are often not as efficient as democratic regimes 
in broadening access to most citizens. This is often due to poor affordability (lower household 
incomes, little financing to farmers, etc.), availability (poor supply, poor infrastructure, 
corruption, etc.), and poor quality & safety (little diet diversification, bad protein quality, poor 
presence of grocery sector, etc.).  
I further argued that given the economic growth in the region since the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, richer countries should be more susceptible to incidence of social unrest. 
Using GDP per capita as a proxy for standard of living, I find this to be the case. After undergoing 
regional economic growth since 2001, more than 15 percent of the population in sub-Saharan 
Africa transitioned from poverty ($2 or less) to low-income ($2.01-$10), or from low-income to 
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middle-class ($10.01-$20) (Kochhar 2015).68 However, this economic transition is a frail one. A 
recent household-panel survey indicates that individuals are more likely to fall back into poverty 
“if they are hit by unemployment, illness, a disability, extreme climate events or conflict.69” 
Therefore, when climate shocks occur, the capabilities of people to sustain their new acquired 
economic status can remain static or decline, deepening economic grievances that can trigger 
episodes of social unrest.  
 
Climate variability, land degradation and communal violence 
In chapter 5, I examine the effects of climate change on land degradation and the impact of that 
degradation, in turn, on the frequency of social unrest in sub-Saharan Africa. I further argue that 
the interaction of climate change proxies and land degradation should increase the occurrence of 
communal violence given that climate shocks can reduce the pastures available for pastoralists to 
feed their livestock. Indeed, the results show that higher levels of land degradation are positively 
associated with a higher frequency of communal violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, I find 
that climatic shocks do increase the frequency of communal violence via higher levels of land 
degradation. 
 Specifically, it is the interaction between land degradation and drier than average years at 
t-5, that is associated with an increased incidence of communal violence. The substantive effects 
show that moving from a -1 standard deviation to a -3 standard deviation, the probability of 
communal violence almost doubles. Thus, longer dry-spells worsen land degradation, which in 
turn decreases pastures for the livestock of pastoralist communities. This results are in line with 
                                                 
68 In a more optimist view, the African Development Bank suggests that Africa now has the fastest-growing middle-
class in the world, and by 2060 the Bank expects the 1 billion Africans to join the middle-class. The report is available 
at: http://www.afdb.org/  
69The Chronic Poverty Report 2014-2015: The road to zero extreme poverty. Available at: 
http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8835.pdf  
103 
 
Fjelde & Uexkull (2012) who find that negative deviations in rainfall are associated with a higher 
risk of communal conflict. 
 
Future research 
I have answered some relevant questions here about the effects that climate change has had on 
social cohesion in sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2012. I have examined whether poor access 
to food and water can be a determinant of protest participation and whether climatic shocks have 
decreased cereal yields, that in turn, increase the frequency of social unrest. I have also tested 
whether climatic shocks exacerbate land degradation, that in turn, increases the frequency of 
communal violence. The answer to these questions is that, in fact, poor access to water and food 
was a contributing factor for protest participation from 2005 to 2013. I also find that climatic 
shocks have begun to decrease cereal yields and exacerbate land degradation in the region, 
resulting in episodes of conflict. Though these questions are now answered, several more remain 
unanswered. 
 Further research is needed in several fronts. First, more research should focus on 
identifying how climate change will affect specific regions and sub-regions of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Doing this will allow scholars and policy makers to determine the most adequate regions better 
suited to grow crops that resistant to the expected changes in climate. For instance, Nigeria and 
South Africa are the largest growers of maize in sub-Saharan Africa.70 However, predictive climate 
models expect Nigeria to become wetter and South Africa to become dryer (IPCC 2014). Given 
the susceptibility of maize to water variations, maize yields are expected to decline in both 
countries as global temperatures continue to increase. Such declines would further increase the 
current 28 percent of maize imports required to meet demand in the region, leaving it dependent 
                                                 
70 International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA): http://www.iita.org/maize  
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on major international exporters like the United States and China. However, shifting to more 
climate resistant crops such as cassava, while boosting maize production better suited areas can 
mitigate future food shortages for the region. 
 Second, further research should also focus on unpacking other intervening causal nexus 
between climate change and conflict processes.  For instance, while research on the impact of 
climate change on water scarcity has made some progress recently (Savenije 2000; Rockström et 
al. 2009; Devlin & Hendrix 2014), more research is needed to better understand the role that 
climate change will have on freshwater and the potential consequences of water scarcity of various 
conflict processes. 
 Finally, while the results presented in this dissertation are pessimistic, future analysis 
should focus on the premise that climatic shocks can also lead to a more peaceful world, rather 
than one plagued by conflict. In fact, anecdotal evidence from periods of weather shocks show 
higher levels of cooperation, rather than conflict, among individuals. For instance, in the aftermath 
of hurricane Karina that hit the city of New Orleans in 2005, people and communities came 
together to help their friends and neighbors by building temporary shelters, or to share water and 
food. Many of such episodes of cooperation after naturals hazard are common. Failing to 
incorporate this into the discourse of climate security can “influence the perceptions of the actors 
in local and regional conflict and lead to militarized responses and thus perhaps contribute to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy” (Gleditsch 2012: 3). 
 
Conclusion  
The findings in this dissertation have begun to close important gaps in the climate-conflict 
literature. However, as previously mentioned, further research is required to have a more 
comprehensive understanding of the socio-political impacts that climate change will have in sub-
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Saharan Africa. In the meantime, this research suggests that poor access to basic needs such as 
food will be exacerbated by higher-than-average temperatures in years to come, further increasing 
the propensity and frequency of social unrest in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the findings also 
indicate that peripheral communities are particularly vulnerable to violence as prolonged dry spells 
exacerbate land degradation in the region. 
These findings provide evidence of the fragile situation facing sub-Saharan Africa in the 
emergence of a changing climate. Policy makers and academic research should find adequate ways 
to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change on basic resources in a way that fosters 
economic development and places no burden on ecological systems and the environment. 
Achieving his will require a “great balancing act” on several fronts.  As it pertains to food security, 
four issues are crucial. First, overall access to basic needs such as water and food need to improve 
in areas where access is poor or non-existent. Second, governments need to be more efficient in 
how they grow, what they grow and how they grow different crops in the region. Doing this can 
allow for an increase in per acre crop yields as well as lessening the impact of climatic shocks. 
Third, governments must find different ways to grow meat and shift to less intensive meat diets. 
Currently only about half of the world’s crop calories are destined for human consumption, while 
the rest are used to feed livestock or turned into biofuels (Foley et al. 2011). Finally, governments 
ought to implement policies that reduce food waste. It is estimated that about one third of the food 
produced worldwide is lost or wasted. Food loss and waste in developing countries mostly takes 
place during post-harvest and processing stages.71 The FAO estimates that the current loss or waste 
could feed  an additional 300 million people.72 Achieving this “great balancing act” is not an easy 
                                                 
71 FAO. Global Initiative on Food Loss and Waste Reduction. Statistics [accessed June 1, 2016] at: 
http://www.fao.org/save-food/resources/keyfindings/en/  
72 Ibid. 
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task. However, taken together, these steps can increase food supplies in order to mitigate the impact 
that climate change, and thus, reduce the likelihood and frequency of social unrest in the region. 
The challenges for mitigating the effects of climate change among peripheral communities 
are equally complex. First, governments should increase market access to pastoralist communities. 
While European markets are often hard to penetrate due to strict meat quality and safety 
safeguards, as well as competition from large scale competitors, livestock imports to North Africa 
and the Middle East have increased. Thus, there are some available markets for pastoralist 
communities to export their meat and livestock. Second, government programs should be offered 
to peripheral communities that target specific development of skills that can be useful for people 
who wish to migrate towards urban areas. Finally, government investment in early weather 
monitoring systems can provide sufficient time for pastoralist communities to respond to long term 
dry spells. For instance, pastoralist communities can choose to protect core livestock during 
climate shocks and/or decide to sell more livestock before weather conditions worsen. 
This dissertation began with two goals. On one hand, it wanted to incorporate food access 
into the collective action literature. I proposed that people with poor access to water and food 
would be more likely to participate in protests, compared to those who have uninterrupted access 
to these basic needs. On the other hand, this research wanted to untangle the climate-conflict nexus. 
That is to say, rather than assuming that people react violently to climate shocks, I argued that 
climate shocks decrease cereal yields and exacerbate land degradation, that in turn, increased the 
frequency of social unrest and communal conflict, respectively. Now, I conclude this research 
project by asserting that indeed, poor food access in sub-Saharan Africa motivates people to 
protest, particularly employed individuals who fear impoverishment. Moreover, the results lead 
me to claim that climate shocks have begun to negatively impact social cohesion in sub-Saharan 
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Africa through intensifying land degradation and declining cereal yields. While for now consensus 
eludes the climate-conflict research, the quest for a better understanding of this complex 
relationship should not be abandoned. 
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Appendix A: Afrobarometer questions used in the analysis  
        Original answer      Recoded answer          Afrobarometer  
              options     (if applicable)         question # 
Dependent variable  
 
Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens.  0. No, would never 
For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have  1. No, but would  0. No 
done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you  2. Yes, once or twice           1. Yes                 Q23C 
do this if you had the chance: Attend a demonstration or protest   3. Yes, several times 
march?         4. Yes, often 
 
         __________________________________________________________ 
Independent variables 
         0. Never       
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you     1. Just once or twice 
or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat?  2. Several times       Q8A 
[same coding scheme used for having: Enough water to drink?]  3. Many times       Q8B 
         4. Always 
         __________________________________________________________ 
  
Do you have a job that pays cash? Is it full-time or   0. No, not looking   
part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even   1. No, looking   0. Unemployed 
if you are presently working)? (*Not Looking/ ** Looking)  2. Yes, part-time*   1. Employed part-time   Q98 
         3. Yes, part-time**  2. Employed full-time 
         4. Yes, full-time* 
         5. Yes, full-time** 
         __________________________________________________________ 
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Controls  
 
For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official  0. Not a member  
leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member:  1. Inactive member     Q22B 
some other voluntary association or community group?   2. Active member 
         3. Official leader 
         ______________________________________________________ 
 
         0. Not at all interested 
How interested would you say you are in public affairs?   1. Not very interested      Q13 
         2. Somewhat interested 
         3. Very interested 
         ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
In your opinion how much of a democracy     1. Not a democracy 
is [Ghana/Kenya/etc.]?       2. A democracy with major problems       Q42A 
         3. A democracy with minor problems        
         4. A full democracy          
 
         ______________________________________________________ 
 
How old are you?       18-110           Q1 
         ______________________________________________________ 
 
Respondent’s gender       1. Male    0. Female      Q101 
         2. Female   1. Male 
         ______________________________________________________ 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  0. No formal schooling 
         1. Informal schooling only 
         2. Some primary schooling 
         3. Primary school completed 
         4. Some secondary school/high school        Q90 
         5. Secondary school completed 
         6. Post-secondary qualifications, other than university 
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         7. Some university 
         8. University completed 
         9. Post-graduate       
         ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Do you come from a rural or urban area?     1. Rural  0. Rural 
         2. Urban   1. Urban    Q113 
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